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I.

INTRODUCTION

With a bold Republican majority in both houses, the 104th
Congress examined the reauthorization of many of the federal environmental statutes, including the Comprehensive Environmental
Resource, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),' popularly
known as "Superfund." While the 104th Congress had very little
success in its environmental mission, these issues are being revisited
by the 105th Congress. Because of the extreme costs associated
with CERCLA clean-ups and the disincentive the Act creates to the
transfer of property, CERCLA reform is a linchpin of the Republican agenda on revising the federal environmental effort. One of
the more hotly contested CERCLA reform issues is the alteration of
the scheme that allows designated trustees to sue to recover Natural
Resource Damages (NRDs) resulting from the loss of or injury to
the natural resources within their trusteeships.
CERCLA NRDs are a statutory expansion of common law principles and have many inherent problems, including the uncertain
science of valuation of natural resources, the extent of the trusteeships and vague statutory provisions. This Article seeks to provide a
thorough understanding of CERCLA NRDs, thereby enabling the
Congressional debate to be judged in its proper context. If CERCLA NRDs are altered, trustees will be forced to reteach themselves
the rules of an already difficult game. If CERCLA NRDs are eliminated (which seems unlikely at this date), other avenues of recovery
may become attractive to certain trustees. Given both the uncertain
results associated with the untried NRD experiment and the large
number of entities involved in this process, Congress should proceed cautiously with its efforts.
This Article examines the proposed reform of the CERCLA
NRD provisions and suggests that appropriate remedies can be
found by fine-tuning the existing program and reformulating it in
an independent NRD statutory structure. The Article first provides
a brief description of the role of environmental regulation in society and the statutory scheme behind CERCLA.2 It then describes
the fundamental principles of CERCLA NRDs and examines the
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 3767 (1980) (codified as amended
by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (1994)).
2. For a discussion of the background of CERCLA, see infra notes 16-63 and
accompanying text.
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various parties that may have standing as CERCLA NRD trustees.
Next, this Article discusses the economic theory behind the valuation of an injury to a natural resource and the process the trustees
may follow to apply this economic theory to a particular injury. It
then details the regulatory history of the CERCLA NRD program,
the judicial decisions that have confused its application, and the
real world practices of NRD trustees.4 Finally, it looks at the various
congressional and executive proposals to reform the NRD program,
5
and suggests a more reasonable reform alternative.

II.

MARKET FAILURES AND THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

In many senses, the purpose of environmental law goes beyond
the rhetoric of protecting human health and the environment, and
serves to provide actors with a level playing field on which to operate. Providing economic participants with certainty, without guaranteeing a fundamental tenet of enforcement, should be an
important consideration in the formulation of general policy goals
of environmental enforcement. Pollution, despite its negative connotation, is a natural by-product of life, especially human life. Environmental law cannot avoid this fact, and it cannot absolutely
protect against pollution without halting economic progress and,
some argue, even maintenance of the human species. Environmental law instead needs to advocate for pollution reduction, internalization of costs, and individual accountability in the quest for the
most economically efficient market equilibrium. By remembering
the need for certainty, environmental regulators can avoid many of
the bitter attacks that they have endured over the past several years.
The advent of environmental law as a regulatory system marks
the beginning of a transformation of capitalism. Unregulated capitalism does not provide a mechanism to account for the costs imposed upon society by pollution resulting from production and
maintenance. Producers of goods and services will not, of their
own accord, incorporate those costs shifted to the environment into
the market price of their wares, primarily because they do not bear
the costs, society does. The "Tragedy of the Commons" is that each
rational herdsman will want to graze an additional steer on the
commons to maximize his revenues, leaving the commons over3. For a discussion of CERCLA NRD Claims, see infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.

4. For a discussion of the Ohio v. Department of Interiorand Colorado v. Department of Interiorcases, see infra notes 271-313 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of congressional proposals for NRDs, see infra notes 438-64
and accompanying text.
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grazed and dilapidated. 6 This desire arises from the fact that rational herdsman will, by placing another steer on the commons,
receive the full benefit of that placement, but only pay a fraction of
the true cost of that placement. 7 The remainder of the cost is
borne by society. In the context of the modem capitalistic welfare
state, government may end up paying for the rehabilitation of the
commons. 8 If no such government apparatus exists, then the cost is
realized as a loss of the commons for all, even those that grazed
their herd carefully and conservatively upon the commons.
Through regulation, society can seek to correct this market failure
by taxation or coercion, making each rational actor internalize the
costs placed upon society by his production. 9 Because, in theory,
regulation will make each rational actor face the true costs of his
action, the market will be able to function as it should, with individual benefit maximization and a profit motive facilitating a proper
market equilibrium. 10
The practical application of this theory brings with it many fundamental policy questions. First, what is the appropriate method to
internalize the societal cost previously unrealized? Should internalization be accomplished through permits, 1 command-and-control

6. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at
1243, 1244, reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETmICS 127,
131-32 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend, eds. 1993); see also H. Scott
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource. The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124 (1954) (article sometimes cited as first to propound theory that costs of
use of common good escapes free markets).
7. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244, reprintedin VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS, at 132.
8. See id.
9. The field of "Ecological Economics," which analyzes the cost-benefit of sustainable development and allocation of natural resources, has sprung to life in
recent years. See ROBERT CONSTANZA ET AL., THE ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS OF SUSTAiNABILrr-Y- MAKING LOCAL AND SHORT-TERM GOALS CONSISTENT WITH GLOBAL AND

LONG-TERM GOALS (1990) (presenting abstracts of current works in ecological eco-

nomics by various authors).
10. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1245, reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS, at 135.
11. An important innovation has been the creation of marketable permits,
which allow the market to establish the value of the right to pollute. See Richard B.
Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 11-16 (1985) (discussing economic-based incentive system of transferable
pollution permits). In addition, obtaining a permit imposes three sorts of costs
upon the applicant: (1) costs of obtaining the permit, including application fees,
and the consultants' and attorneys' fees for design, testing and advocacy; (2) costs
of staying within the limits set by the permit; and (3) costs of disclosure, both to
the public and the regulatory agency, that are contained within the permit
conditions.
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regulations, taxes, penalties or imprisonment? 12 Second, what is
the appropriate magnitude of the costs that should be internalized?
Third, how should society reallocate costs that have already been
thrust upon it by past pollution? Should society spread these costs
among the whole, or should it seek to redistribute these costs to
some defined sub-group of society? If the latter, how should society
define this sub-group?
CERCLA, through its remedial, cost recovery and NRD provisions, seeks to provide answers to the questions regarding past pollution. The United States is pockmarked with countless acres of
contaminated soil and groundwater.' 3 Congress enacted CERCLA
not only to clean-up contaminated sites, but also to allocate the
costs of remediation and natural resource injury to the corporations that benefitted from the pollution.14 These environmental
costs then become a normal cost of doing business, a consequence
to be borne by the corporation and its consumers as the market
allows.15 With full internalization of environmental costs, a purchaser can choose among goods and services based upon the true
cost, or at least a "truer" cost, of the good or service. This theoretically results in a more accurate market equilibrium. Thus, regulation serves to correct the market failure.
III.

THE

CERCLA PROCESS

In 1980, officials at the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) used public concerns aroused by dramatic discoveries of contamination at Love Canal in New York to move Congress to enact
12. The timing of the method of choice is an important consideration with
respect to this question (i.e., proactive versus retroactive placement).
13. See generaly THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION
65-103 (1987) (discussing types of contaminants, potential health effects, and costs
of contamination in realm of groundwater quality).
14. See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980), reprinted in 1 SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WoRmS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABInTY ACT OF 1980, 320 (1983).
"[T]hose who benefit financially from a commercial activity [should] internalize
the health and environmental costs of that activity into the costs of doing busi-

ness." Id
15. The counter-argument to this theory is that society as a whole benefitted
from the pollution as well as the corporations and individual owners. Because the
goods and services produced were not priced at their "full cost," society benefited
from the creation of additional jobs and cheaper goods and services.
Statement of Sen. Smith, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment, May 11, 1995.

The allocation of the benefit between society and the polluter, however, is
unknown.
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CERCLA. 16 CERCLA, commonly known as "Superfund," provides
for the clean-up of sites polluted by hazardous substances. As a remedial statute, CERCLA was enacted to supplement the meager
remediation provision found in sections 7002 and 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 17 which failed to
provide a comprehensive system for the clean-up of old and abandoned sites.' 8 In addition, the strict and severe costs that CERCLA
imposed provided added incentives for businesses to complete due
diligence checks before the purchase of property and to assure that
their wastes were disposed of with appropriate care.
Through the primary enforcement authority of EPA, 19 CERCLA seeks to protect the public health and the environment by pro20
viding several mechanisms for the clean-up of contaminated sites.
CERCLA section 104 authorizes the President to act to address conditions when there is either: (1) a release or a substantial threat of
release of any "hazardous substance" into the environment; or (2)
"a release or a substantial threat of release ... of any pollutant or
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial dan21
ger to the public health or welfare."
16. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENviaoNMesNTAL PROTECTnON AGENCr. ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS, FROM NIXON To CLINTON 133 (expanded ed. 1994)
[hereinafter LANDY].
17. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended in the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA) at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994)). RCRA was added as an amendment to
the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. SWDA is recognized as RCRA, and will be
referred to as such in this Article.
18. See DAVID MAzMANIIA & DAVID MOR LL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S
Toxics Poucy FOR THE 1990s, 27-30 (1992). The RCRA imminent hazard or corrective action provision, CERCIA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, originated in the 1976
version of RCRA, but only became a viable dean-up authority with the amendments of 1980 and 1984. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1269
(3d Cir. 1993). RCRA corrective actions rely on the creation of permit conditions
requiring the remediation of operating RCRA-permitted facilities. See id
19. The President has delegated many of his responsibilities under CERCLA
to EPA. This delegation is authorized by Exec. Order 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1994)).
20. See F. Henry Habicht II, The Expanding Role of Natural Resource Damage
Claims Under Superfund, 7 VA.J. NAT. REs. L. 1, 4 (1988).
21. CERCLA § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994). CERCLA defines
"hazardous substances" broadly, incorporating all of the substances regulated by
the other federal environmental statutes (except petroleum). See id. § 101 (14), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14). CERCLA defines "pollutant and contaminant" as any substance
that will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause "death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, physiological malfunctions ... or physical
deformation" to any organism, with the exception that such pollutants and contaminants do not include petroleum. Id. § 101 (33), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (33).
The petroleum exclusion, however, does not apply to NRD claims because
CERCILA section 107(0(2) incorporates NRDs under section 311 of the Clean
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EPA acts to effectuate environmental clean-ups either by issuing a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) to some or all of the
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) requiring them to correct
the conditions, 22 or by proceeding with the remediation itself2 3 and
subsequently drawing money from the Superfund to pay for it.24
A CERCLA clean-up action consists of either a removal 25 or a
remedial 26 action, although the CERCLA response at a particular
site may use a combination or series of these two types of actions.2 7
Removal actions, which allow EPA to react relatively quickly to a
release or threat of release, are limited by the statute to two million
dollars in costs and twelve months in duration. 28 Remedial actions
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which expressly includes restoration costs incurred by
the federal and state governments responding to oil spills. See CERCLA
§ 107(0 (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2). The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-61, also contains NRD provisions that address NRDs arising from releases
of oil.
22. See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
23. See id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
24. See id., 42 U.S.C. § 9604. The Superfund was originally established with
$1.6 billion in its coffers. Currently, the amount is around $8.5 billion. The Fund
receives monies from the Corporate Environmental Tax, levied primarily on chemical manufacturers, as well as more general Congressional appropriations.
25. See id. § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). Section 101 (23) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[t]he terms 'remove' or 'removal' means (sic) the cleanup or removal of
released hazardous substances from the environment, such as actions as
may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous
substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damages to the public health
or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release ....
Id.
26. See id. § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Section 101 (24) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[tihe terms 'remedy' or 'remedial action' means (sic) those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal
actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment ....
Id.
27. See id. § 104(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2).
28. See id. § 104(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1). Section 104(c) (1) provides:
[u]nless (A) the President finds that (i) continued response actions are
immediately required to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency, (ii)
there is an immediate risk to public health or welfare to the environment,
and (iii) such assistance will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis,
or (B) the President has determined the appropriate remedial actions
pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection and the State or States in
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are the more administratively and usually technically intensive of
the two types of actions and consist of any action that exceeds these
29
limitations.
To proceed through the CERCLA remedial cycle, a contaminated site must suffer through a parade of analyses and reports,
including the Preliminary Assessment (PA), the Site Investigation
(SI), the Remedial Investigation (RI), the Feasibility Study (FS), the
Record of Decision (ROD), the Remedial Design (RD), and the Remedial Action Plan (RAP).S0 Usually, the progress of a remedial
site through this parade depends on factors such as the danger associated with the site, the competence and workload of the program and legal personnel assigned to the site, the political climate,
and, most importantly, the EPA region's need for a "bean" to justify
its budget. As the parade progresses, the reports and analyses become more technical and complex, and consequently take more
time to assemble.
During the PA, EPA completes an estimate of a site's relative
contamination to determine if the site warrants further study. If
EPA determines that further analysis is warranted, it will complete
an SI.31 The SI is a more detailed investigation into the nature of
the site, during which the site is scored according to the Hazard
Ranking System (HRS), a mathematical model.3 2 The HRS not
only determines if a site should be included on the National Priorities List (NPL),33 but also assigns priority to a site based upon its
which the source of the release is located have complied with the requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection, or (C) continued response
action is otherwise appropriate and consistent with the remedial action to
be taken obligations from the Fund, other than those authorized by subsection (b) of this section, shall not continue after $2,000,000 has been
obligated for response actions or 12 months has elapsed from the date of
initial response to a release or threatened release of hazardous
substances.
Id.
29. See id.
30. The Preassessment and Assessment Phases of Natural Resource Damages
are described at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-11.25, 11.30-11.38 (1996). For a further discussion of the Assessment Process, see infra notes 232-64 and accompanying text.
31. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.24. (describing process to screen information on site
relating to discharge or release).
32. See CERCLA § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c); 55 Fed. Reg. 51532 (Dec. 19,
1990).
33. See id. A site is placed on the NPL if it scores above a 28.5 on the HRS. See
MAZMANiAN Ar
MoRELL, supra note 18, at 31. While the HRS depends upon objective criteria such as the hydrogeology of the site and the amount of people
affected by the contamination, subjectivity is inherent to several of the factors.
This may allow political influence to sway the listing determination. See THOMAS
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contamination relative to the contamination of other sites
nationwide. s4
If a site is placed on the NPL, EPA may proceed with the RI
itself or order some or all of the PRPs to perform it, whether
through a UAO or an Administrative Order on Consent (AOC).35
The RI is a meticulous and time-consuming analysis of the geology,
hydrogeology, hydrology and contamination of the site and the surrounding area.3 6 The FS sets out the various options for the reme37
diation of the site contamination analyzed in the RI.
After finalizing the FS, EPA releases a Proposed Remedial Action Plan (PRAP) announcing to the public the remedial method
8
EPA proposes for the site and requesting public comment.3
Before and during this public comment period, the state and EPA
may enter into fairly sophisticated negotiations concerning the
remedy at the site. This occurs as a function of the National Contingency Plan (NCP),39 the regulation promulgated by EPA to govern the CERCLA process; however, the amount of input EPA
accepts from the state depends on the working relationship between the program and technical personnel at the two agencies and
the need for the state to concur with the remedy. This concurrence
is required if the remedial action is to be paid by EPA from the
40
Superfund.
After the public comment expires, EPA issues the ROD for the
remedial action as well as its response to the comments received.

The ROD documents the options that EPA examined as well as the
factors that support its decision, with the goal of achieving, as
closely as possible, four broad statutory requirements: (1) cost effectiveness; 4 1 (2) the preference for permanent and significant reducW. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING Up THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND 6 (1993).
34. See CERCLA § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c). Whether or not the HRS "priority" is actual, fictional or merely bureaucratic is subject to debate.
35. See CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 33, at 6.

36. See id
37. See Gardner M. Brown, Jr., Economics ofNaturalResource DamageAssessment:
A Critique in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 73, 75-86 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith, eds. 1993)
(discussing remedial investigation and natural resource damage assessment).
38. See Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the
Courts in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSS=MENT 26, 34 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith, eds. 1993).
39. THE NATIONAL OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES POUUTION CONTINGENCY

PLAN, 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1996).
40. See CERCLA § 104(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (3) (1994).
41. See id. § 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (a).
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tion in the volume, toxicity or mobility of the hazardous substance,
pollutant or contaminant;42 (3) the protection of human health
and the environment; 43 and (4) the federal and state applicable or
relevant and apprp ate requirements (ARARs).44 By using ARARs as
the basis for clean-up standards, CERCLA avoids enunciating its
own express clean-up numbers and methodologies and allows for
variability among the states. 45 Under all circumstances, a CERCLA
lawyer must remember that the ROD is the administrative keystone
to the remedy at the site and to the obligations that EPA will seek to
secure for the performance of the remedy.
The RD consists of the engineering plan for the Remedial Action, and the RAP outlines how the RD will be implemented during
the Remedial Action. Clean-ups are conducted according to guidelines set out in the NCP. 46
To replenish the Superfund, CERCLA section 107 creates a
cause of action for cost recovery from PRPs. 47 A PRP is liable for
response costs, natural resource damages, and costs of specified
health assessments if the following four elements are met:
42. See id. § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b).
43. See id. § 121(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1).
44. See id. § 121(d) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (2) (A).
45. For example, state municipal waste regulations promulgated under a state
version of the Solid Waste Management Act would be "applicable" to a NPL site
that operated as a municipal landfill during the time of the regulations. To be
binding, a state standard must be more stringent than the federal. See CERCLA
§ 121(d) (2) (A) (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (2) (A) (ii). The primary battle between
the states and EPA concerns state ARARs. EPA may officially waive a state's
ARAR for a clean-up in certain circumstances. See id. § 121(d) (4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d)(4). Other standards or procedures may be used by EPA, in its sole discretion, in planning the clean-up, and are known as TBCs (to be considered).
46. As a practical matter, the same consulting and engineering companies
generally perform the various stages of Superfund clean-ups, regardless of whether
EPA or the PRPs officially have responsibility for the Remedial Action.
47. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Courts are split over whether PRPs
can use section 107 to recover costs they have incurred responding to a release or
threatened release. The majority of the circuits have held that PRPs are limited to
a contribution action under CERCLA section 113(f). See CERCLA § 113(f), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f); see also United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d
1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that PRP's claim against second PRP was
contribution claim controlled by § 113(f)); United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that suit brought by responsible
parties against other allegedly responsible parties was action for contribution
rather than action for cost recovery), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo
Coatings Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that PRP's
action under CERCLA to recover clean-up costs was action for contribution rather
than for cost recovery). As time progresses, this issue will become more complex,
as courts begin to examine the facts to determine if a section 107 claim is warranted. See, e.g., Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp.
221, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that CERCLA impliedly authorized PRP to bring
private response recovery action against another PRP).
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(1) the site is a CERCLA "facility,"48 which includes any
contained enclosure and "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located...;"49
(2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance is occurring; 50
(3) the release or threatened release has caused the incurrence of response costs;5 1
(4) the party falls within one of the four categories of liable persons:
(a) current owners and operators of the
f-acility;5 2
(b) owners or operators of the site who owned
or operated it at the time of the disposal of the
53
hazardous substance;
(c) persons who arranged for the disposal or
treatment (or for the transport for the disposal
or treatment) of hazardous substances; 54
(d) persons who transport any hazardous substance to a facility of their choice for disposal or
55
treatment.

48. CERCILA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
49. Id § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). A "facility" includes areas where hazardous substances have passively migrated in the groundwater even if beyond the
property boundaries of its source.
50. Id. § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4). "Release" is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the
abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)," excluding releases solely within the workplace, emissions from engine exhausts, nuclear releases regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the normal
application of fertilizer. Id. § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). For the definition of
"hazardous substances," see supra note 21.

51. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). The plain language
of the statute implies that response costs must have been incurred before an NRD
claim will lie. See id. § 107(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0. However, the district court in
New York v. GeneralElec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 298 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), held that the
government trustee need not have expended money on clean-up before commencing an NRD claim. See id.
52. CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1).
53. I& § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2).
54. Id. § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3).
55. Id. § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4).
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If a PRP falls into one of these classes, it is essentially strictly liable,
and jointly and severally responsible for the entire costs of clean56
up.
57
CERCLA provides only a few general defenses for liability,

including when the release occurred as the result of an act of war,58
an act of God,5 9 or certain third party actions. 6° The enumerated
defenses are exclusive, 61 and no equitable defenses are recognized
for liability under section 107 of CERCLA. 62 While this liability
strategy brings many complaints from the affected industries, Congress designed the system to expedite remediation of property contamination, unhampered by the constraints of traditional
65
negligence law and causation questions.
IV.

THE BASICs OF

CERCLA NRD

CLAIMS

Generally, a CERCLA NRD claim includes recovery for residual
injury to natural resources after completion of remediation, as well
as a compensatory value for the loss of that resource during
remediation and recovery. 64 Conceptually, an NRD claim is not pu56. Beginning in the early 1990s, courts began to chip away at CERCLAjoint
and several liability, which was first judicially enunciated in United States v. ChemDyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The Alcan I and Alcan H
decisions hold that while a PRP is joint and severally liable, it may present evidence
demonstrating that the liability is divisible and that an allocation based on the
evidence is proper. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan I), 755 F.
Supp. 531, 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), and United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan II), 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992).
57. See CERCIA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
58. See id. § 107(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1); see, e.g., United States v. Shell
Oil Co., No. CW. A. 91-0589-RJK, 1992 WL 144296, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1992)
(addressing affirmative defense of act of war under section 107 of CERCLA).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (addressing affirmative defense of act of God under CERCLA section 107).
60. See CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). Under this defense,
the defendant must show that the release or threat of release was caused solely by
an act or omission of a third party. See id.
61. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d
1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCILA is strict liability statute with only
limited number of statutorily-defined defenses available); United States v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp., 823 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding available defenses strictly and exclusively defined by CERCLA § 107(b)).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 646, 658 (S.D.
Ind. 1992). The court stated that "if there are any legal defenses to CERCLA liability, including equitable defenses, they are found in [section 107(b)] ....
[The
equitable defense of] [l]aches is not listed in [section 107(b)] ....
It is not a
defense to CERCLA liability and will not keep the United States from bringing its
claims." Id. However, a PRP's relative share of the overall liability is determined by
equitable considerations.
63. See MAz mANL & MoRELL, supra note 18, at 29-30.
64. See Habicht, supra note 20, at 5-6.
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nitive; instead it is a claim that serves to complement cost recovery
by converting the injury that cannot or will not be remediated, into
a dollar value, or other restoration action, in order to compensate
the public for its loss. In this respect, CERCLA is based on a "background" or "pristine" condition, even if that basis is only approached by means of economic theory. 65
CERCLA NRD trustees may assert a claim to recover damages
for injury to natural resources within the scope of their trusteeship.
A CERCLA NRD claim arises from scattered sections of the statute.
Section 107(a) (4) (C) imposes liability upon responsible persons
for "injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from such a release." 66 The statute defines "natural resources" as:
. . . land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,

drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or
otherwise controlled by the United States.... any State or
local government, any foreign government, any Indian
tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction
67
on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.
CERCLA section 301 (c) directs the President to publish two
sets of regulations, the Type A and Type B rules, to aid trustees in
the task of determining the amount of the NRD claim. 68 The trustees are not required to follow these regulations in the assessment of
their NRD claim. 6 9 However, if trustees assess their claim in accordance with the regulations, CERCLA section 107(f) (2) (C) grants the
70
assessment a rebuttable presumption, presumably of correctness.
The President, through the Department of Interior (DOI) and the
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), has slowly promulgated these
rules in a piecemeal fashion, subject to several challenges by indus65. Conversation with Donald Brown, Director, Bureau of Hazardous Sites
and Superfund Enforcement, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, September 11, 1994.
66. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C).
67. I& § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). The definition of natural resources
provides the only statutory indication of the scope of these trusteeships. For a
discussion of the precise scope of the various trusteeships, see infa notes 156-67
and accompanying text.
68. See id. § 301 (c), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c). For a further discussion of the Type
A and Type B rules see infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
69. See CERCLA § 301(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c).
70. See CERCLA § 107(f) (2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (C). For a further discussion of the presumption, see infra notes 398-406 and accompanying text.
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try, state and environmental entities. 71 Specifically, the watershed
case involving CERCLA NRDs, Ohio v. Department of Interior72 arose
out of a challenge to the Type B rule.
Monies recovered for NRD claims must be used "to restore,
replace, or acquire the equivalent of" the injured resource. 73 CERCLA section 104(b) (2) directs the President to promptly notify the
appropriate state and federal trustees of potential NRDs for releases
being investigated under this section, and to seek to coordinate assessments, investigations and planning with the trustees. 74 Theoretically, trustees may seek compensation for CERCLA NiRDs from the
Superfund. However, NRDs' claims against the Superfund are severely limited by CERCLA; 75 in fact, such claims are prohibited by
76
the Internal Revenue Code.
A.

Statutory Defenses

CERCLA's general defenses, 77 apply to NRD claims as well as
cost recovery actions and UAOs. In addition, section 107(f) (1) provides a shield for liability for CERCLA NRDs when the injury is specifically identified as an irreversible and irretrievable commitment
71. The history of these rules cannot be easily summarized.
72. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Ohio v. Department of
Interior,see infra notes 276-308 and accompanying text.
73. CERCLA § 107(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1), reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
[s]ums recovered by the United States Government as trustee under [42
U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1)] shall be retained by the trustee, without further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of
such natural resources. Sums recovered by a State as trustee under [42
U.S.C. § 9607(0 (1)] shall be available for use only to restore, replace, or
acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the State ....
Id.
74. See id. § 104(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (2).
75. Realistically, the SARA Amendments placed the Superfund beyond the
reach of NRD trustees. Section 111 (b) (2) (A) requires that administrative and judicial claims against PRPs be exhausted before NRD claims against the Superfund
can be brought. See CERCLA § 111 (b) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (b) (2) (A). Section
111 (e) (2) limits the payment of such claims to 15% of the monies paid out of the
Superfund in a fiscal year, and allows for the President to reduce that percentage
to zero if the balance of the Fund is needed for response actions. See id.
§ III(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(e)(2). Except to avoid an "irreversible loss of natural resources or to prevent or reduce any continuing danger to natural resources
or similar need for emergency action," section 111(i) requires that the relevant
trustees approve a plan for the use of the money before any payment out of the
Fund is made for NRD activities. See id. § llI(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(i).
76. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(c) (1) (1994). Congress added this provision to the
Internal Revenue Code during the 1986 reauthorization of CERCLA. See SARA

§ 517(a).
77. For a discussion of CERCLA's general defenses, see supra notes 57-62 and
accompanying text.
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of natural resources in an Environmental Impact Statement or a
comparable analysis, and when the injury is authorized by permit,
78
and the release is in compliance with the permit.
B.

Causation

79

CERCLA limits the broad application of NRDs. While cost recovery actions may be predicated on a threatened release,8 0 an
NRD claim must be based on the occurrence of an actual release,
analogous to an element of causation-in-fact.8 1 In addition, while
cost recovery plaintiffs do not have to prove proximate cause,82 the
NRD provision limits recovery to those injuries "resulting from" a
release.83 This causation requirement has been interpreted differently by different courts, ranging from a showing that the release
was the "sole or substantially contributing cause"8 4 of the injury to a
lesser standard of "contributing cause." 8 5 In Ohio v. Department of
Interior, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a
portion of the NRD regulations8 6 that require the trustee to establish a causal "pathway" between the natural resource and the particular hazardous substance.8 7 The court noted that CERCLA does
not clearly address whether this causal link requirement is less stringent than that required by the common law.88
When a Superfund site is found in a pervasively contaminated
location and the hazardous substances at the site are relatively common, this causation requirement could prove fatal to the trustee's
claim. The causation requirement also makes the question of allo78. See CERCIA § 107(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1).
79. For a discussion of causation issues as they relate to natural resource
damages, see Glenn Willett Clark, Causation-In-Factin NaturalResource Damages and
in Assessment of Response Costs, 5 ENvrL. CLAiMs J. 7 (1992).
80. See CERCLA § 107 (a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4); see alsoAlcan I, 964 F.2d
252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992).
81. See Habicht, supra note 20, at 7. Compare CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42
U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) with CERCLA §107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (4) (C).
82. See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 419 (D.NJ. 1991) (stating
"[d] efenses based on lack of actual or proximate cause are insufficient under CERCLA and therefore must be stricken.).
83. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C).
84. See United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., No. CV-90-3122-AAH, 1991
WL 183147, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1991).
85. See In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 722 F. Supp. 893, 897 n.8 (D. Mass. 1989).
86. For a discussion of these NRD regulations, see infra notes 237-64 and accompanying text.
87. See Ohio v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
88. See id. at 470-72.
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cation of damages among multiple PRPs particularly difficult, especially because equitable factors are not typically reviewed outside
the context of a contribution action between PRPs pursuant to
CERCLA section 113.89 Section 113(f) (1), which directs courts to
examine equitable factors in contribution actions, speaks only to
response costs. 90 Because Congress placed this provision in CERCLA as part of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) effort, it is not beyond reason to venture that
Congress simply overlooked the application of such factors to
NRDs.
C.

Right to a Jury Trial

Because of the large cost and complexity, trustees will seek to
avoid bringing NRD cases before juries. A majority of the courts
that have addressed this issue, however, have found that ajury trial
is constitutionally mandated for CERCLA NRDs. 9 a For example, in
New York v. Lashim Arcade Co.,92 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that Congress "impliedly preserved a right
to a jury trial" for CERCLA NRD claims. 93 Because the relief to be
granted included not only equitable relief, but also legal damages,
the district court additionally held that even if Congress had not
preserved the right, the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitu94
tion provided the defendant with the right to a trial by a jury.
Thus, the court decided that both equitable cost recovery claims and
NRD claims are to be tried before the jury. 95
V.

TRUSTEE DESIGNATION

CERCLA utilizes a common law term of art, "trustee," to designate those government entities authorized to recover NRDs pursu89. David G. Mandelbaum, Toward a Superfund Cost Allocation Principle, 3
ENv-L. LAw. 117, 122-31 (1996); see also CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f) (1) (1994).
90. SeeCERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
91. See Bradley M. Marten and Cestjon L. McFarland, LitigatingCERCLA Natural Resource Damage Claims, ENvr. RPm (BNA) at 670, 672 (July 19, 1991.)
92. 881 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
93. See id. at 102-03.
94. See id. at 103-04; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
95. See Lashins, 881 F. Supp. at 104; see also In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 997-98 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding that NRD and cost
recovery claims required by Senate amendment are to be tried by jury). But see
United States v. Wade, 653 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that no right
to jury trial attaches when party seeks declaration of rights and liabilities under
CERCILA).
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ant to its provisions. 9 6 Trustees are able to sue for NRDs resulting
from injuries to natural resources within their trusteeship. 97 CERCLA does not specify the dividing line between federal, state and
tribal trusteeships. In the early years of the NRD program, state
and federal trustees avoided the issue of the delineation of their
particular trusteeships by filing jointly.9 8 However, as state and
other trustees learn the intricacies of assessment and valuation, they
are more likely to assert claims without federal trustees. 99
A.

Federal Trustees

CERCLA section 107(f) (2) (A) directs the President to designate federal trustees to pursue NRD claims. 100 The President has,
by Executive Order, designated the Secretaries of the Interior,
Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, and Energy as the federal trustees for the resources under their departments' respective jurisdictions. 10 1 The NCP further delineates the roles of the several
departments serving as federal trustees.10 2
DOI, through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS),
manages resources including migratory birds, anadromous fish, certain species listed pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 103
96. See CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2) (A) (1994) (providing
that President shall designate "trustees" for CERCIA NRDs).
97. The scope of a trusteeship is in itself a complicated legal issue. Because
this analysis would overshadow the examination of the parties that can lay claim to
being trustees, it has been relegated to its own chapter. For a discussion of the
scope of a trusteeship, see infra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.
98. See Habicht, supra note 20, at 6 n.27.
99. See ARCO Seeks to Preclude CV Study from Evidence in $ 713-Million NRD
Claim, SUPERFUND REPoRT, July 24, 1996, at 21. For example, the state of Montana
is currently seeking $ 713 million in NRDs for injuries to the Clark Fork River. See
id.
100. See CERCIA § 107(f)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A). This section
provides that the President shall, in the NCP, designate the federal officials who
shall serve as trustees for NRDs under both CERCLA and the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321. These officials shall "assess damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources" within their trusteeship. See CERCLA
§ 107(0 (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0 (2) (A). For state trusteeship, the Governor of
the state "shall designate State officials who may act on behalf of the public as
trustees for natural resources" for CERCLA and CWA NRDs. See id. §
107(0 (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (B).
101. See Exec. Order 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, reprintedas amended in 3 U.S.C.
§ 9615 (1994). The Executive Order provides that "the following shall be among
those designated in the NCP as Federal trustees for natural resources: (1) Secretary of Defense; (2) Secretary of the Interior; (3) Secretary of Agriculture; (4) Secretary of Commerce; (5) Secretary of Energy." Id.
102. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.600 (1996).
103. Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). For a discussion of the relationship between CERCLA NRDs and the ESA, see Sharon K.
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and their critical habitats, National Wildlife Refuges and National
Fish Hatcheries. DOI also serves as trustee for those lands held and
managed by the National Park Service. The Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency
(NOAA) 104 serves as the trustee for marine resources, including
coastal environments and habitats, habitats of anadromous and catadromous fishes, certain species listed under ESA and their critical
habitats, tidal wetlands, and commercial and recreational marine
fishery resources. DOI and NOAA have traditionally served as the
vanguard of NRD analysis and advocacy.
The Department of Agriculture serves as trustee for the National Forests under the U.S. Forest Service. The Departments of
Defense and Energy, which own large tracts of land, serve as trustees for the natural resources injured on their property. While these
Departments frequently serve as "plaintiff" trustees, they are more
likely to be defendants, arguing against NRD claims asserted by federal, state, and tribal trustees.
In August 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order
13016, which amends Executive Order 12580, and authorizes federal trustees to issue administrative orders under Section 106 of
CERCLA for the restoration of injured natural resources. 105 An
eruption of criticism followed this action, primarily due to the confusion that will result as the NRD program and the more traditional
Superfund remedial program collide.1 0 6 The White House,
through the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), is currently
drafting a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to define the
roles of the various trustee agencies. 10 7 Until the MOU is signed
Shutler & Elinor Colbourn, Natural Resource Restoration: The Interface between the Endangered Species Act and CERCLA 's NaturalResource Damage Provisions, 24 ENVT'L. L.
717 (1994).
104. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994). The Oil Pol-

lution Act also assigns NOAA additional NRD duties under its statutory structure.
NOAA has been particularly active in its trusteeship roles, establishing a Damage
Assessment and Restoration Center, which intermingles attorneys, economists and
scientists. See Marten & McFarland, supra note 91, at 670. NOAA has convened the

blue ribbon panel on Contingent Valuation Methodology. See id.
105. 61 Fed. Reg. 45871 (1996).
106. See "White House Seeks To Address Fears Over Superfund Executive Order," E

iRoNrENrAL

PoLcY

ALERT,

December 4, 1996, at 10; "Executive Order

On Natural Resources Damages Needs Clarification on Roles, Commenters Say,"
EmrormENr REPORTER, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1940.
107. See "White House Floats Draft MOU To Implement Contentious Executive Order," INSmE EPA's SUPERFUND REPORT, Special Report, Jan. 23, 1997; "White
House Vows To Alter Superfuid MOU; State, Industry Fears Linger," ENVIRONMENTAL PoIc REPORT, Feb. 12, 1997, at 10.
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and the roles of the federal trustees are clarified, uncertainty will
hamper NRD efforts.
B.

Tribal Trustees

As part of SARA, Congress included Indian tribes as trustees
for CERCLA NRDs, adding 500 potential CERCLA NRD trustees to
the melee.'10 CERCLA section 107(f) (1) provides that NRD liability shall include: "any Indian Tribe for natural resources belonging
to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such tribe, or
held in trust for the benefit of such tribe, or belonging to a member of such tribe if such resources are subject to a trust restriction
on alienation." 10 9 CERCLA defines "Indian Tribe" as any organized
group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians. 1 0 The NCP designates tribal
chairmen, the heads of governing bodies, or a person designated by
tribal officials as trustees for the tribal governments."' When the
United States serves as a representative of a tribal trustee, DOI
12
serves as trustee."
Indian tribes, because of their geographic placement and historic patterns of pollution, 113 have a greater opportunity than most
trustees for an active presence to protect Tribal resources, and to
serve as creative and vocal CERCLA NRD trustees. 1 4 The trusteeships of many tribes extend beyond the physical boundaries of their
tribal reservations due to entitlements to use nonreservation natural resources protected by treaty.' 15 Interestingly, CERCILA grants
108. See Barry Breen, Citizen Suits ForNaturalResourceDamages: Closing a Gap in
FederalEnvironmental Law, 24 WAx FOREST L. REv. 851, 863 (1989) (citation omitted) (stating SARA "added Indian tribes as authorized trustees... [creating] 500
more potential plaintiffs") [hereinafter Breen, Citizen Suits]. But see Richard A. Du
Bey & James M. Grijalva, The Assertion of Natural Resource Damage Claims by Indian
Tribal Trustees, 4 ENVrL. CLA MsJ. 175, 175 (1991) (noting that over 270 federally
recognized Indian tribes exist in United States).
109. CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1994).
110. See id. § 101(36), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(36).
111. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.610 (1996). Upon designation of an appropriate
trustee, tribal officials shall notify the President of the designation. See id,
112. See id. § 300.600(b)(2).
113. See Major Tribal Group Calls for Expanded Tribal Role in NRD Pr o
,
SUPERFUND REPORT, July 12, 1995, at 21 [hereinafter Major Tribal Group].
114. See id, In their role as trustees, the tribes have used not only litigation
but also special legislation to seek NRDs. See Idaho Tribe Seeks Fundsfrom Congressfor
NaturalResourceDamages, SUPE RuND REPoRT, July 27, 1994, at 22 (discussing Coeur
d'Alene Reservation and Bunker Hill Mining & Metallurgical CERCLA Site in Kellogg, Idaho).
115. See Du Bey & Grijalva, supra note 108, at 175.
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tribal trustees a potentially longer NRD statute of limitations than it
11 6
does other trustees.
C.

State Trustees

CERCLA section 107(0 (2) (B) directs the Governor of each
state to designate state officials to act as trustees for CERCLA
NRDs. 117 The statute fails to specify how this designation can be
completed, not addressing whether a designation should be executed by statute, executive order, or even by informal means.1 1 8 Because of this ambiguity, an attorney defending an NRD claim
asserted by a state trustee should examine the purported designation to determine if other state agencies or municipalities have an
argument for standing, or at least demand that the settlement language is broad enough to bind any other possible "state" NRD
trustees.
In Pennsylvania, for example, the gubernatorial designation
takes place in the Commonwealth's CERCLA analog, the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA)." 9 This statute, however, fails to
clearly enunciate the terms of the designation. Rather, HSCA provides that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER)12 0 has the power and duty to act as trustee for the
Commonwealth's natural resources, and may assess and collect
damages to natural resources under its trusteeship. 12 1 However,
the statute also provides that: "[t]he department, a Commonwealth
agency, or a municipality which undertakes to abate a public nuisance under this act or take a response action may recover those
116. See CERCLA § 126(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9626(d) (1994). This section provides
that no action by an Indian tribe shall be barred until the later of the applicable
statute of limitations and two years after the United States gives notice that it will
not commence an action for the tribe or the United States fails to do so within the
applicable statute of limitation. See id. As of late 1991, the federal government had
neither indicated such an intent nor brought an NRD claim for a tribe. See Du Bey
& Grijalva, supra note 108, at 178.
117. See CERCLA § 107(f) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (B). This duty also
requires the appointment of state trustees for NRDs under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
118. The Governor of Massachusetts, for example, designated the state's Secretary of Environmental Affairs as its CERCLA NRD trustee by sending a letter to
the President. See Letter from Governor Michael S. Dukakis to the President (May
17, 1989), cited in Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 473 (D.
Mass. 1991).
119. See The Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, Act of October 18, 1988, P.L. 756,
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101-6020.1305 (West 1996).
120. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources has recently
been renamed the "Department of Environmental Protection."
121. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.301(14).
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response costs and natural resource damages."12 2 In addition,
HSCA seemingly only allows the imposition of civil penalties when
DER seeks cost recovery or pursues an NRD claim.12 3
This statutory conflict leaves open to interpretation the issue of
whether local governments and other Pennsylvania state agencies
have independent standing to sue for NRDs, and, if they do,
whether these claims are authorized under both CERCIA and
HSCA, or merely under HSCA. 124 Because the Pennsylvania Fish
and Boat Commission and the Pennsylvania Game Commission
have civil penalty provisions in their organic statutes for injury done
to natural resources, 25 the issue is even more muddled. Because of
the size and schizophrenia inherent to government, one trustee
agency could conceivably file suit without the knowledge of another
trustee agency, either accidentally or intentionally. Such possibilities require a PRP's attorney to pay close attention to the details of
any NRD claim and to the structural niche of the plaintiff trustee.
D.

Municipal Trustees

Aside from the possibility of gubernatorial designation of a local government as trustee, CERCLA fails to clearly state whether
municipalities may be NRD trustees in their own right. If all of the
circuits find that municipalities can be CERCLA NRD trustees independent of a gubernatorial designation, the universe of potential
CERCLA NRD plaintiffs would swell to include 3,000 counties,
19,000 municipalities, 16,000 townships, and 28,000 special districts
nationwide.' 2 6 While these entities may have a right to a pre-existing common law action for some sort of NRDs independent of
122. Id. § 6020.507(a).

123. See id. § 6020.507(e).
124. The Court in The Borough ofDublin v. Sun Chemical Corp., Pa. Ct. Cmmn.
Pls., Bucks Cnty. No. 88-4736-21-2, Oct. 28, 1992, addressed this question in an
unpublished opinion and found that the DER's NRD trusteeship under HSCA is
not exclusive. In so holding, the court allowed a claim for HSCA NRDs by the
plaintiff borough to move forward (opinion on file with author).
125. See 34 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2161 (West 1996) (Pennsylvania Game
Commission statute providing that Commonwealth may recover damages in civil

action against any person who causes injury to any streams or stream beds by polluting or littering); 30 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 1996) (Pennsylvania Fish
and Boat Commission statute providing that Commonwealth may recover compensatory and punitive damages in civil action against any person who damages wild-

life habitat).
126. SeeJohn T. Ronan & Earl L. Hagstrom, CERC!M Enforcement Shifts to NaturalResource Damages, HAZMAT WoR-LD, Mar. 1991, at 10, 12; Joseph J. Maraziti, Jr.
Local Governments Opportunities to Recover for NaturalResource Damages, 17 ENvrL. L.
REP. 10036, 10037 n.5 (Feb. 1987) (Maraziti represented the Town of Boonton in
Town of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp.).
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CERCLA, a CERCLA claim is a more powerful tool due to the statute's strict, joint and several liability scheme.
Prior to SARA, in three decisions, 12 7 the district courts held
that CERCLA grants local governments standing as CERCLA NRD
trustees. 128 Essentially, the decisions found that a municipality has
trustee standing based upon two lines of legal analysis. The first
holding reasoned that because the statutory definition of "state"
used the connector "includes" instead of the term "means" used in
the other statutory definitions, Congress intended for the list of
governmental entities to be illustrative rather than exclusive.' 2 9
127. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp. (New York II), 697 F. Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that city could enter settlement as "state" as provided for
under CERCIA); City of NewYork v. Exxon Corp. (New York I), 633 F. Supp. 609,
617 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that private parties not required to secure approval
from federal or state authorities before commencing private cost recovery action
under CERCLA); Town of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 667
(D.N.J. 1985) (holding that municipality is "state" as provided for under
CERCLA).
128. The Boonton decision served as the foundation for the New York I and
New York H decisions. In addition to the theories provided in the above text, the
Boonton court noted that it would be anomalous to provide states a NRD cause of
action but refuse such an action to local governments when resources owned by
local governments are expressly included in the statutory definition of natural resources. See Boonton, 621 F. Supp. at 666.
With regard to the "authorized representative" theory, the Boonton court held
that the state authorized the town to act as NRD trustees because the town owned
the contaminated property and the state environmental protection agency had directed the town to remediate the site. See id. at 667. The court avoided choice of
law questions. See id
In New York I and New York H, two individual judges ruled separately on the
local government standing issue. In New York I, the court followed Boonton's definition of "state" argument to deny a motion to dismiss which asserted that the city
was not a CERCLA NRD trustee. See New York , 633 F. Supp. at 619. With regard
to the "authorized representative" argument, the court noted that this was a factual
question that it could not decide without more evidence. See id.
In New York 1H,the court reaffirmed its earlier holding on a motion for summaryjudgement. See New York H, 697 F. Supp. at 684. The court denied the argument that CERCLA's plain meaning demanded judicial restraint based upon the
use of the word "includes" in the definition of natural resources. See id. To equate
the term "means" and "includes," the court opined, would render both meaningless. See id. The court also noted that CERCIA does not relegate municipalities to
private party status, and that affording them the ability to sue for NRDs was consistent with the statutory structure and purpose. See id. at 685. Furthermore, the
court asserted that to deny the municipality standing was particularly inappropriate in the case at bar, because the state environmental protection agency had
placed its stamp of approval on the settlement by being ready to release its own
CERCLA claims. See id. at 686.
129. See CERCLA § 101 (27), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part: "(t]he terms "United States" and "State" include the several
states of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Marianas, and any other territory or possession over which the
United States has jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
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The second holding relied upon section 107(f) (1), which provides
that: "[t] he President, or the authorizedrepresentativeof any State, shall
act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources to
recover for such damages."18 0 Because CERCLA did not define "authorized representative," 8 1 the courts looked to the facts of the
cases to decide if the governor, through his executive agencies, had
authorized the municipality to act as a CERCLA NRD trustee.
As part of SARA, Congress added section 107(f) (2) (B) to CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the designation of state trustees.1 32 The House version of the SARA bill contained language
clarifying the definition of "state," but the Senate version did not.153
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
explained: "[t]he conference substitute does not include the House
amendment to the definition of 'State' leaving it to the court's interpretation of this provision."1 34
Maraziti asserts that this statement endorses the Boonton and
the New York I and New York II holdings that municipalities are authorized to sue as CERCLA NRD trustees.'8 5 Maraziti also cites
floor statements by Senator Frank Lautenberg, of New Jersey, a
member of the conference committee, as support for the codification of the Boonton decision.ls3 However, an equally plausible reading of these two statements is that Congress decided to let each
individual jurisdiction fashion its own interpretation, without the
intent of being bound by the two preceding decisions.
130. Id. § 107(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1) (emphasis added).
131. The term was not defined before SARA, and Congress did not define it
when it enacted SARA.
132. See CERC.A § 107(f) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (B) provides that the
"Governor of each state shall designate State officials who may act on behalf of the
public" as NRD trustees under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321, and assess damages for injury to resources within their trusteeship. Id.
(emphasis added). Maraziti asserts that the use of the mandatory "shall" and the
permissive "may" means that the trusteeship may be re-delegated by the trustee
designated by the governor. See Maraziti, supra note 122, at 10039.
133. See Maraziti, supra note 126, at 10039 (citations omitted).
134. Maraziti, supra note 126, at 10039.
135. See id. at 10038.
136. See id. Senator Lautenberg noted that the final version of the bill would
"uphold the Boonton decision allowing municipalities to sue for cost recovery
under the same Superfund provisions available to States, and to serve as trustees
for natural resource damages." Id. "This provision permits communities to move
ahead with cleanup plans of their own." 135 CONG. REc. S14912 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). This statement, notably, does not restrict
all courts to the Boonton analysis. See Maraziti, supra note 126, at 10039. For a
discussion of the Boonton court's analysis of CERCLA, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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Post-SARA, at least five courts have held against the theory of
13 7
municipal trusteeship independent of gubernatorial designation.
The fact that the statute allows differing viewpoints in itself indicates that clarification would be appropriate.
Several commentators have argued that allowing municipalities
to have standing as CERCLA trustees is appropriate and desirable. 13 This argument, however, is unpersuasive. CERCLA in general, and the NRD provisions in particular, impose extraordinarily
large amounts of liability upon parties. While providing disincentives for polluting activities is undoubtedly in the public interest,
the regulated industries both demand and deserve certainty as to
the identity of NRD trustees and should not be faced with the burden of facing additional plaintiffs at every site. In addition, states
and municipalities are fundamentally different in terms of their sovereign status. In a federalist system, a state has standing as a sovereign that a municipality cannot replicate, and CERCLA recognizes
this difference. Further, as sovereigns with a broad base of regulatory responsibilities, states are far more likely to appreciate ecological values that transcend the limited political and geographic
boundaries of municipalities. With these facts in mind, it is obvious, from a public policy perspective, that municipalities should not
have standing as NRD trustees.

137. In Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mass. 1991), the
Bedford court noted that municipalities and local governments derive their power
entirely from the independent sovereignty of the state. See id. at 471 n.3. The
court then noted that the statutory definition of "person" explicitly includes a "municipality" and other "political subdivisions of a State." See id. at 471. The court
then held that municipality trusteeship hinders CERCLA's objectives because of
potentially inconsistent application. Following City of Philadelphiav. Stepan Chemical
Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989), the court refused to examine the definitions of "state" in other statutes and CERCLA's legislative history for guidance. See
Bedford, 755 F. Supp. at 470-71. In Werkin v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D.
Minn. 1990), the Werlein court noted that the plain language of the statute controls. See id. at 910. The court then distinguished the Boonton analysis on the basis
that in those cases the municipalities actually owned or controlled the natural resources at issue. See id. at 909. In the case before the Wf'rin court, state law entrusted the state, not the municipality-plaintiff, with the care of natural resource (a
groundwater aquifer). See id. at 910.
138. See Maraziti, supranote 126, at 10036; Breen, Citizen Suits, supra note 108;
Michael J. Wittke, Comment, Municipal Recovery of Natural Resource Damages under
CERCLA, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 921.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

25

384

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. VIII: p. 359

E. Private Causes of Action
CERCLA section 107(f) does not create a private right to action for NRDs.' 3 9 In Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County,14° the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court
grant of a summary judgment for a claim of monetary damages due
to the loss of potential withdrawals of artesian wells by a private
water utility.' 4' The utility was previously denied recovery of response costs in excess of monitoring and evaluation costs, and attempted to recover NRDs for the amount of water that it lost as the
result of the remedial action. 42 The court noted that CERCLA
prohibited the recovery of economic losses, and that the utility's
recovery of such losses would amount to an usurpation of the state's
CERCLA NRD claim. 143 Given the particular language of the NRD
provisions and the statute's prohibition on double recovery and for
damages, pre-enactment, injuries, the court declined to read CERCIA to allow for private NRD claims. 44
F.

Citizens' Suits

14
In environmental law, citizens' suits consist of two types. 5
The first type consists of suits by citizens, acting as "private attorneys
general," against other citizens for alleged violations of statutory obligations. These suits seek compensation, not for a private injury,
but for a public harm. 46 The second type consists of suits by citizens against the government for a failure to complete a mandatory
47
duty imposed by statute.'
CERCLA section 310(a) creates both types of citizens' suits,
subject to the limitations on pre-enforcement review found in section 113(h).' 48 Section 310(a) (1) provides for a "private attorneys

139. See Carl W. Breeding & Lloyd R. Cress, Jr., NaturalResource Damages Under
CERCLA: A New Beginning?, 20 N. Ky. L. REV. 23, 32 (1992).
140. 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 644.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 650.
See id. at 649-50.
See Breen, Citizen Suits, supra note 108, at 851.
See id. at 870.
See id. For a discussion of these different kinds of citizens suits, seeJE-

FREY MILER, CITIZENS Surrs: PRVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAW 3 (1987).

148. CERCIA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) removes jurisdiction, except for
cases of complete diversity (which are very rare) and cases involving state ARARs,
for the review of response action decisions, unless one of the following has occurred: (1) a cost recovery suit has been filed; (2) the United States has brought an
action to enforce a section 106 order, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); (3) a PRP has brought
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general" citizens' suit which allows private parties to challenge "any
violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order" issued under CERCLA, 149 but the remedy available is limited
to injunctive relief.150 Because NRDs without government action,
do not qualify as a standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or
order issued under CERCLA section 301 (a) (1) does not grant citizens' groups the ability to seek NRDs.
Section 310(a) (2) creates a citizens' suit to compel the performance of nondiscretionary duties by the President and other
federal officials. 151 The language of section 107(f) (2) (A),152 which
contains the federal designation provisions, states that the federal
officials designated by the President shal assess damages for injury
to natural resources within their trusteeship. 55 Therefore, a citizens' group may be able to utilize section 310(a) (2) to compel the

an action for reimbursement from the Fund under 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b); (4) a citizens suit has been brought challenging a remedial or removal action, subject to
the limitation that a removal action may not be challenged if a remedial action is
to be undertaken at the site; or (5) the United States has moved to compel a
remedial action under 42 U.S.C. § 9606. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h) (1994).
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended for CERCIA section
113(h) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (4) to allow citizens groups to seek review of a site's
remediation as its different phases are completed, but the courts are split over
whether it allows that review to occur after the ROD has been signed or after the
remedial action under the ROD has been completed. See, e.g., Neighborhood
Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 832-34 (D.N.J. 1989) (discussing legislative history of CERCIA § 113 and citizens' suit review).
149. CERCLA § 310(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (stating "any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf (1) against any other person.., who is
alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement or
order" of CERCLA).
150. See id. § 310(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c). Section 310 cannot be used to seek
recovery of response costs. See Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 148-51
(D.RII. 1989). However, the recovery of attorneys' fees is allowed under this
provision.
151. See CERCILA § 310(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2) (stating "any person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf... (2) against the President or any
other official of the United States . . . where there is an alleged failure . . . to
perform any act or duty" under CERCLA).
152. Id. Section 107(0 (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0 (2) (A), states in pertinent
part:
[t] he President shall designate in the [NCP] the Federal officials who
shall act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources under
[CERCLA] and [Section 321 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321].
Such officials shall assess damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss to
natural resources...
Id. (emphasis added).
153. See id
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trustees to assess the NRDs at a site.IM However, section
107(f) (2) (A) does not direct trustees to file a claim for NRDs;
therefore, a section 310(a) (2) citizens' suit may be of limited usefulness. In addition, the limitations on preenforcement review
would fully apply as CERCLA section 113(h) (4) does not grant a
court jurisdiction unless the citizens' group alleges a violation of a
CERCLA requirement. 55 This limitation forces citizens' groups to
wait until some other basis for jurisdiction exists, such as a cost recovery action.
Breen argues that federal statutes should be amended to allow
citizens suits for NRDs.15 6 He asserts that structural and political
imperfections, budget constraints, and the urgent need to force
polluters to internalize the pollution costs support the need for
such amendments. 5 7 Breen claims, accordingly, that any benefits
resulting from such amendments will outweigh the burdens of the
enactment.
Breen's position ignores the reality that many parties that
would be targets of NRD citizens' suits would merely be the remaining deep pockets. Further, these parties would likely only be tangentially responsible for the natural resource injury, as arrangers or
as successors to age-old and defunct corporations. Given this reality, the government trustees, rather than citizens' groups, are the
appropriate entities to determine the propriety of pursuing a CERCLA NRD claim. Not every CERCLA site or release justifies the use
of a NRD claim, and the decision to pursue a certain PRP for NRDs
is best left to the prosecutorial discretion of a public servant.
VI.

THE SCOPE OF THE TRUSTEESHIP

CERCLA defines "natural resources" very broadly, as the
following:
154. See Breeding & Cress, supra note 137, at 32-33 (discussing "whether main-

taining actions for injury to natural resources is a mandatory duty or is a discretionary decision of the trustee").

155. See CERCIA § 113(h) (4); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (4). This section states:
[a]n action under section 9659 of this tide (relating to citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial actions taken under section 9604 of
this tide or secured under 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a
removal where a remedial action is to be under taken at the site.

Id.
156. Breen, Citizen Suits, supra note 108, at 873-80 (arguing that citizen suits
are the "logical next step to the expansion of the natural resource damages
doctrine").

157. See id.
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• . . land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,

drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or
otherwise controlled by the United States .... any State or
local government, any foreign government, any Indian
tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction
158
on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.
This definition allows recovery of NRDs for injury to virtually any
media within the government domain. Breen categorizes CERCLA
"natural resources" into four classes based upon this statutory definition:1 59 (1) "[r]esources owned by a government, or over which
the government otherwise has exclusive possession"; 16° (2) resources encompassed by the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 1 an age-old
judicial theory that holds certain resources in trust for the benefit
of the public; (3) "[r]esources that are regulated directly by a government" in order to protect the environment; 162 (4) "[r]esources
that are not directly regulated by a government for purposes of environmental protection," but could be regulated within the bounds
1 6

of the Constitution.

3

As one progresses down the scale from group (1) to (4), the
nexus between the governmental control and the natural resource
lessens, demanding a broader reading of "natural resources" to include the resource in a NRD claim.16 4 In 1984, Breen noted that
the extent of the nexus required between the government's inter158. CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). For a further discussion of
CERCLA's definition of "natural resources," see supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
159. See Barry Breen, CERCLA's NaturalResource Damage Provisions:What Do We
Know So Far?, 14 ErvrL. L. REP. 10304, 10305 (Aug. 1984) (outlining the status of
NRD recovery under CERCLA) [hereinafter Breen, Natural Resource Damage
Provisions].
160. Id. This is a broad category because the federal government alone owns,
in fee, 32.5% of the nation's land. See id. at 10306; see also Cynthia Carlson, Federal
Property and the Preemption of State Public Trust Doctrines, 20 EwrrL. L. REP. 10003,
10006 (Jan. 1990) (focusing on federal preemption of state public trust doctrine in
regulation of private activities on federally owned coastal and riparian lands).
161. See Breen, Natural Resource Damage Provisions, supra note 159, at 10305.
To distinguish between the Public Trust Doctrine and the trustee role created by
CERCLA, I will capitalize "Trust" and "Trustee" when referring to the former, and
will use lower case letters when referring to the latter.
162. Id. Examples given are endangered species, coastal zones, public water
supplies and air. See id. at 10307. With regard to air, problems of proof of damage
and valuation immediately come to mind.
163. Id. at 10305.
164. See id. at 10305-06 (discussing extent of government control in each of
four categories).
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ests and the natural resource "will probably have to await judicial
interpretation, further legislative elaboration, or at least regulatory
definition.'

65

In 1986, DOI attempted to provide some regulatory definition
when it published a final rule providing general procedures to be
used in the assessment of NRDs. 16 6 The rule followed the statutory
definition of natural resources, but categorized the affected media
into the following: surface water resources; ground water resources;
air resources; geologic resources; and biologic resources.' 6 7 Industry, states and environmental groups challenged the rule, leading to
the landmark decision of Ohio v. Department of Interior' 68 The Ohio
court indirectly approved of three of Breen's classes of NRD resources: those owned by a government, those held in the Public
Trust and those substantially regulated or maintained by govern69
mental entity.1
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine

Like much of environmental law, CERCLA NRDs derive from
common law theories, including the Public Trust Doctrine and the
related Parens PatriaeDoctrine, 70 as well as general notions of tort,
165. Md at 10306.
166. See 51 Fed. Reg. 27674 (1986). CERCIA section 301 directs the President to promulgate two rules, Type A and Type B, to help trustees assess NRDs. See
CERCLA § 301(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1994).
167. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(z) (1996).
168. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that congressional intent was not to limit the amount that government trustees could recover for harmed natural resources to lessen the cost of
restoration or replacement. See id. at 441-59. Rather, the circuit court found that
DOI had to clarify its interpretation of the applicability of CERCLA NRD provisions to privately owned land that is managed or controlled by federal, state or
local government. See id. at 459-61. Finally, the court stated that exclusively focusing on market value to measure lost value of natural resources was not a reasonable interpretation of CERCLA. See id. at 463-65.
169. See id. at 434.
170. The Parens PatriaeDoctrine is similar to the Public Trust Doctrine, except that it is procedural rather than substantive. See KEVIN M. WARD &JOHN W.
DUFFmLD, NATuRAL RESOURCE

DAMAGES:

LAW AND ECONOMICS

17, 21 (1992).

ParensPatriae,meaning "parent of the country," confers standing upon state governments to sue for the redress of injuries suffered by its citizens. See id. For instance, a state in its capacity as a "quasi-sovereign" can sue a company located
outside of its borders to enjoin some action that harms its citizens within the state.
See Howard Kenison et al., State Actions for Natural Resource Damages: The Enforcement
of the Public Trust, 17 ENvrL. L. REP. 10434, 10436 (Nov. 1987).
In order to sustain a ParensPatriaesuit, a state must demonstrate a separate
interest from those of private parties and that a substantial portion of its citizenry
has been adversely affected by the actions. While most ParensPatriaesuits are injunctive, the state can also seek damages to compensate injuries to its quasi-sovereign interests. See WARD & DurnmLD, supra, at 22. In Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe
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nuisance and trespass law. These theories often intertwine in the
manner only common law allows, with courts adapting caselaw precedent and theories to fit the facts before it. The common law is
now shifting between paradigms, from one of an absolute right of
property ownership to one of regulation over the use and abuse of
property.' 7 1 CERCLA's use of the Public Trust Doctrine as a basis
for trusteeship for NRDs further confuses the matter, making examination of this doctrine necessary.
The Public Trust Doctrine can be traced back to the age of the
Roman Emperor Justinian, 72 and it stands for the proposition that
some resources are simply too important to the public welfare to be
owned by any one person. 173 The doctrine applies only to certain
uses of specific topographical areas and resources. In the United
States, state courts have seen the most frequent use of the Public
Trust Doctrine, and numerous variations exist in the laws of the
various states. 174 Generally, the protected uses include activities
such as fishing, navigation and commerce, and the resources typically include sea beds, the waters over them, the foreshore' 75 and
176
navigable freshwaters.
Colocotrn, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981), the District Court for Puerto Rico
found that Puerto Rico had standing to sue for recovery for injuries to its natural
resources due to an oil spill, based on both the Public Trust Doctrine and the
ParensPatriaeDoctrine. See id. at 1336. The prospect of double recovery is a significant hurdle for Parens Patriae suits, especially if private citizens are also seeking
compensation. See WARD & DuFrLD, supra, at 22-23.
171. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioningthe Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L.R_ 631, 633 (1986)
(stating "modem trends in natural resources law have eroded traditional concepts
of private property rights in natural resources and substituted new notions of sovereign power over those resources"). Recent legislative action suggests that the
popular concept of property rights may be returning to one of absolute ownership,
albeit not without dissension.
172. See Terry Fox, NaturalResource Damages: The New FrontierofEnvironmental
Litigation, 34 S. TEX. L. REv. 521,521 (1993). "By the law of nature these things are
common to mankind - the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores
of the sea." Id. (quoting Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1 [529 AD.]).
173. See Gregg L. Spyridon & Sam A. LeBlanc III, The OverridingPublicInterest
in Privately Owned NaturalResources: Fashioninga Cause of Action, 6 TuL. ENvrL. L.
287, 291 (1993) (citing air, water, land as examples of public trust).
174. For a compilation of state law on the Public Trust Doctrine, see PUrrMNG
THE PuBLIc TRusT DocRINE TO WoRc THE APPLICATION OF TmE Puauc TRUST

DOCTRINE

TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATER AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE
CoAsTAL STATES (David C. Slade ed. 1990).

175. See Cynthia Carlson, Making CERCLA NaturalResource Damage Regulations
Work: The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine and Other State Remedies, 18 ENrTL. L. REP.
10299, 10302 & n.30 (Aug. 1988) (citation omitted). The foreshore consists of the
land between the high and low tide marks. See id.
176. See id.
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In the past thirty or so years, the Public Trust Doctrine has
expanded rapidly due to state statutes, state constitutions and activist judicial interpretations.1 77 In some states, the doctrine now
incorporates resources such as non-navigable waters, state park
land, and air, and uses such as recreation and drinking water supply. 17 8 If the doctrine includes the protection of fishes, wildlife and
179
recreational values, one could argue that it includes water quality
and instrearn use of surface water.' 80 In addition, courts have
found that the Trust imposes an active duty to conserve the Trust
corpus, not just a passive duty to protect it.181
While the United States' application of the Public Trust Doctrine is primarily a creature of state law, the federal courts (using
federal common law) have not hesitated to use the Public Trust
Doctrine.18 2 In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,183 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Illinois state legislature could
not convey lands underlying Lake Michigan to a private party because the land was held subject to an inalienable Public Trust.'8 4
The transfer of title that the legislature was trying to revoke would
only be acceptable if it promoted the public good and could be
accomplished without substantial impairment to the public
85
interest.1
177. See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
JudicialIntervention, 68 MicH. L. Rv. 471, 474 (1970). In 1970, Professor Joseph
Sax published an influential article that may have fostered this trend. Professor
Sax argues that to be a satisfactory tool for resource management problems, the
Public Trust Doctrine must do three things. First, it should "contain some concept
of a legal right in the general public." Second, the doctrine should "be enforceable against the government." Third, the doctrine should "be capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns with environmental quality." Id.;
see also Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1540, 1551
(1985) (citing Sax's article as 31st most cited law review article of all time).
178. See Carlson, supra note 175, at 10302 (citations omitted); WARD & DuFFmLD, supra note 170, at 15-16.

179. See WARD & DuFFIELD, supra note 170, at 16 (citations omitted).
180. See Carlson, supra note 176, at 10302 (citations omitted).
181. See Kenison, et al., supranote 170, at 10440 (stating that public trust has
been extended to national parks).
182. See United States v. Burlington Northern R.R., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287
(D. Neb. 1989) (holding that United States has right to recover damages for lost
wild life in waterfowl production area using public trust doctrine); District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where District of
Columbia raised federal common law public trust doctrine argument).
183. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
184. See id. at 452.
185. See id. The legislature was trying to promote Chicago's economy when it
originally transferred the submerged land. Ironically, the legislature did transfer
title to aid what it perceived to be the public interest. However, it failed to pre-
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The use of the trustee nomicker in the CERCLA NRD provisions can confuse those who do not work extensively with CERCLA
NRDs. CERCLA adopts both state and federal common law as a
basis for trusteeship in NRD claims. The definition of "natural resources" includes resources "held in trust" by a governmental entity. 18 6 The same language was contained in Senate Bill 1480, the
CERCILA predecessor that the Senate passed.' 8 7 The accompanying committee report noted that the purpose of the bill was to "preserve the public trust in the Nation's natural resources."18 8 This,
however, does not mean that the Public Trust Doctrine subsumes
Breen's other three classes of natural resources. 8 9 Those classes
stand as a basis of NRD trusteeship independent of the common
law and the Public Trust Doctrine.
The Public Trust Doctrine works in connection with CERCLA.
Therefore, a state CERCLA NRD trustee hoping to rely on the doctrine to include a specific resource within its trusteeship must find
supporting authority addressing a public concern for whatever resource the PRP has injured. 90 Previous state court precedent that
the public had an interest in the soils of the state for purposes of
agriculture, or a state constitution provision mentioning soils, may
be enough authority to convince a court that soils are within a
state's Public Trust Doctrine Trusteeship allowing a state government to assert a CERCLA NRD claim. Theoretically, a state could
pursue both a CERCLA NRD claim and an independent claim
serve its right to protect the public resource for public uses. Otherwise, the transfer may have been upheld. See WARD & DuFFmLD, supra note 170, at 13.
186. SeeCERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1994). For the definition
of natural resources, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
187. See S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980). See also Breen, Natural Resource Damage
Prmvisions, supra note 159, at 10308 (discussing S. 1480 in relation to CERCLA
amendments).
188. Breen, NaturalResource DamageProvisions,supra note 159, at 10308 (citations omitted).
189. For a discussion of Breen's categories of natural resources, see supra
notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
190. The Trustee may use CERCLA, other state or federal statutes, or the Public Trust Doctrine in whatever combination it prefers. In Puerto Rico v. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit allowed Puerto Rico, the owner
of the injured natural resource, to recover damages for the injury based upon the
Public Trust Doctrine as delegated to an administrative body. See id. at 671. Despite this ability, CERCLA's relatively tight statutory scheme may make CERCLA
the most advantageous tool for recovery. See Gina M. Lambert & Anthony R.
Chase, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provision: Incorporation of the
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 353, 364
(1992) (discussing NOAAs use of CERCLA); Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M. Ward,
NaturalResource Damages: Recovery Under State Law Compared With Federal Laws, 20
ENVrL. L. REP. 10134, (Apr. 1990) (detailing combination of state and federal statutory enforcement tools for NRDs).
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under the Public Trust Doctrine, although the latter may not provide a strong vehicle for the recovery of money damages.
B.

Privately Owned Natural Resources

Resources protected by the Public Trust Doctrine are only one
of Breen's four classes of natural resources. 191 Breen's fourth class,
natural resources not directly regulated by government but which
could be regulated within the confines of the United States Constitution, is based upon the word "appertain" 192 in the statutory definition of "natural resources." 9 3 Commentators Woodward and Hope
assert that, because CERCLA section 107(f) allows NRD claims for
any natural resource within a state's borders, CERCLA NRD claims
could be read expansively to include damages for injury to privately-owned natural resources.' 9 4 Breen, however, argues that
such a broad reading of "appertain" would make the "nexus
descriptors" of the other three classes of natural resources
redundant.195
In its first attempt at a final rule for the Type B regulations, 96
DOI merely repeated the statutory language regarding the definition of natural resources. 19 7 However, in the preamble to that rule,
DOI states that there is "no doubt that [natural] resources owned
by parties other than Federal, State, local or foreign governments
(i.e. privately-owned resources) are not included .. . damages to
privately-owned resources are not to be included in natural resource damage assessments." 98 In other words, DOI's preamble to
191. For a discussion of Breen's Public Trust Doctrine category, see supra
note 161 and accompanying text.
192. Appertain is defined as "to belong either as something appropriate or as
a part, possession or appropriate or as a part." WEBSTER's Tinan NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcIoNARY, 105 (Unabridged 1986).
193. See Breen, Natural Resource Damage Provisions, supra note 157, at 10306.
Breen states that "the CERCIA definition includes resources 'appertaining to' a
government, a phrase that might be sufficiently broad in this context to include
any resources within the sovereign's geographic jurisdiction." 1d. However, Breen
recognizes that if Congress intended to "include any resources within a government's geographic jurisdiction, it could have easily said so." Id. For the definition
of natural resources, see supra note 67.
194. See Duane Woodward & Michael R. Hope, NaturalResource DamageLitigation Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
14 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 189, 207-11 (1990) (recommending statutory change to
make these claims explicit).
195. See Breen, NaturalResource Damage Provisions, supra note 159, at 10306.
196. CERCLA Section 301(c) requires that the President promulgate two sets
of regulations, Type A and Type B, to help trustees assess CERCLA NRDs. See
CERCIA § 301(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1994).
197. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(z) (1996).
198. 51 Fed. Reg. 27674, 27696 (1986).
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the rule added a limitation not contained in the rule, namely, that
trustees should not assess NRDs for injuries to resources owned by
private parties rather than government trustees.
The Ohio court, reviewing the Type B rule, remanded the issue
of whether NRDs could be assessed for injuries to privately-owned
natural resources to DOI for clarification, citing the statutory of
definition of natural resources." 19 9 The court noted that, at oral
"argument, DOI backed away from a literal interpretation of the
preamble's language, and claimed that assessment under the rule
200
would not hinge on public ownership of the natural resource.
The court further stated that a "substantial degree of government
regulation, management or other form of control over the property
would be sufficient" to bring a privately-owned natural resource
within the range of a CERCLA NRD claim.2 0 1 Specifically, the circuit court cited the example that a state law requiring owners of
tideland property to permit public access was a substantial enough
regulation of a resource to bring it within the ambit of the "natural
20 2
resources" definition.
Responding to the Ohio court's remand, DOI claims in its preamble to the revised Type B rule that it "never intended to suggest
that the applicability of the [NRD] regulations hinges solely on
ownership of a resource by a government entity."20 3 In this revised
rule, DOI does not define precisely what privately-owned natural
resources are within the "natural resources" definition; instead, it
notes that the language of the statute controls and that governmental ownership, management, trust, or control is necessary to bring a
natural resource within that definition.2 0 4 Because this analysis necessarily depends on varying federal, state, local and tribal law, DOI
leaves this matter to a case-by-case determination.2 05 DOI does,
however, add a requirement in the revised rule that trustees explain
the bases of their assertions of trusteeship in both the Notice of
Intent to Perform an Assessment and the Assessment Plan, two formal documents required by the rule.2 0 6
199. See Ohio v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
200. See id. at 461.
201. Id.
202. See id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988)).
203. 59 Fed. Reg. 14262, 14265 (1994).
204. See id. at 14268.
205. See id. DOI also notes that a government's assertion of trusteeship does
not receive a rebuttable presumption of validity, and that the assertion of trusteeship will vary as to detail to accommodate the circumstances of the case. See id.
206. See id. at 12463-64.
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VII.

ECONOMIC VALUATION OF NRDs

The quantification of the injury to natural resources is the
most controversial element of the CERCLA NRD scheme, primarily
because of the softness of the economic and environmental sciences that drive it. Natural resources, sometimes termed "natural
assets," provide society with a range of different services, some of
which approximate market-driven commodities that can be expressed in monetary terms and some which are completely alien to
the market and valuation.2 0 7 Section 107(a) (4) (C) of CERCLA directs NRDs to include compensation for injury to, destruction of, or
loss ofOs natural resources, as well as for the cost of assessment of
the damage. 2 9 Section 107(f) (1) limits the use of the funds recovered under the NRD provisions to the restoration, enhancement or replacement of the injured natural resource.2 10 Section 107(f) (1) also
states that: "[t]he measure of damages in any [NRD] action ...
shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or
replace [the injured] resource."2 1 1 The measurement of these
damages depends on a range of economic theories and techniques,
some more reliable than others.
Conceptually, NRDs can be measured by either computing the
restoration cost or the economic valuation of the injured resource,
or a combination of the two.2 12 Economists use both concepts to
place some value on an injury to a natural resource.2 1 3 None of the
economic methods utilizing these concepts offer a universal application, but all add another perspective to the assessment. The four
leading methods214 are: (1) restoration and replacement costs; (b)
market valuation; (c) behavioral use valuation; and (d) contingent
207. See RaymondJ. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith, UnderstandingDamages to Natural
Assets, in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATuRAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 7 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993)

208. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994). The loss of the
natural resource includes the interim loss of natural resources while the clean-up is
in progress. This became evident only after Congress enacted SARA. See Breen,
Citizen Suits, supra note 108, at 866-67.

209. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C). For a discussion of this provision, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.

210. See id § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1).
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
See Breen, NaturalResource Damage Provisions, supra note 159, at 10307.
See id.
See generally VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RE-

SOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

(RaymondJ. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993) (ar-

guing that given increasing number of abandoned waste sites, concerns over cleanup process and residual liabilities for natural resource damages will be as important in future as they are now); Frank B. Cross, NaturalResource Damage Valuation,
42 VAND. L. REv. 269, 321-39 (1989) (arguing that new valuation procedures
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valuation. To analyze the utility of each of these methods, one
should first understand the components of the "value" of an injury
to a natural resource in terms of economic theory.
Theoretically, full compensation for an injury to, destruction
of, or loss of a natural resource includes the value of the lost "use"
and the lost "non-use" of the natural resource.2 15 Use values include consumptive ones, such as fishing and hunting, as well as
non-consumptive ones, such as bird-watching and tourism.2 16 Nonuse values include theoretical values such as the value that society
derives from the mere "existence" of the natural resource, absent
any exploitation of the resource, and the value that is intrinsic to
the resource independent of man.2 17 "Existence value," for example, "is the dollar amount an individual is willing to pay [to ensure
the survival of the resource in a given state, despite the fact that] he
218
. .does not plan to use the resource now or in the future."
While use values can theoretically be derived from an examination
of the market or using traditional common law tools, non-use values usually cannot.2 19 In addition, most of the resources for which
NRDs are sought are unique or public goods that are not regularly
traded on the open market, making the determination of use values
220
even more difficult.
Restoration or replacement costs serve as an estimate of the costs of
either restoring the injured resource itself (usually at the same loca*

should be adopted that better reflect full range of natural resource value and
thereby better protect environment).
215. See A. Myrick Freeman III, Nonuse Values in NaturalResource DamageAssessmenA in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT 264, 265 (RaymondJ. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993) (stating that
ignoring significant non-use values can lead to misallocation of resources).
216. See Cross, supra note 214, at 281.
217. See id. at 282.
218. Ohio v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 476, n.73, (citing 51 Fed.
Reg. 27692, 27721); see also Idaho State Dep't of Health v. Southern Refrigerated
Transp. Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1869 (D. Id.Jan. 24, 1991). Cross asserts that
existence value consists of three distinct components: (1) "option value," which is
the dollar amount an individual, not presently using the resource, is willing to pay
to reserve the option to use the resource in a certain state at some point in the
future; (2) "vicarious value," which is the value a person places upon a natural
resource despite the fact that he never intends to use it; and (3) "intertemporal
value," which is the value a person places upon the preservation of a natural resource in order to ensure that future generations may have the opportunity to use
ift. See Cross, supra note 214, at 285-86. While this terminology may vary among
commentators, the underlying theory is consistent.
219. See Cross, supra note 214, at 269, 282, 289. Cross argues that use value is
a more certain means of determining damages because it measures actual behavior, rather than attitudes. See id at 289.
220. See Edward J. Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damages: Economics for CERCLA Lauyers, 14 ENvrL. L. REP. 10311 (Aug. 1984).
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tion) or providing an adequate substitute resource. 221 Problems
with this method include uncertainty as to the baseline state of the
resource, the unique value of ancient ecosystems, ecological complexity (which often makes restoration impractical), and the great
costs associated with restoration. 22 2 Market valuation techniques, best
suited for determining use values, rely on prices and values set by
market transactions. 22 3 Economists can look at the reduction in the
value of real estate, lost park entrance fees, or the price of fish lost
due to the injury to make these types of determinations.2 24 Because
of their role in real world transactions, market valuation techniques
have the most appeal to NRD defendants. However, any use of
market values necessarily ignores the intrinsic value of the resource
and often overlooks its ecological significance. 225
Behavioral use valuation supplements other valuation techniques to refine the determination of the value of public goods.
For example, if the injured resource is in a public park, economists
may calculate the value of the entrance fees lost because of the injury and add that amount to the estimated costs that the lost visitors
would have undertaken to visit the park. This technique is known
as "travel cost valuation." 22 6 Although such techniques are based
on verifiable human behavior, they fail to consider the ecological
and inherent value of the injured resource and the value of travel
time, and fail to compensate for imperfect information.2 27 Even
with these problems, travel cost value is the best available means to
estimate overall use values.2 8
Contingent valuation (CV) is the most controversial method of
NRD assessment. This method utilizes survey sciences to poll the
populace as to their perceptions as to the value of the injured resource and tabulates a societal value by adding the responses together.2 9 For example, if a release injures wildlife such as a seal
population, survey professionals will draft a survey and poll members of the affected populace to determine the value of the injury to
individual members of the populace. 23 0 It then uses these individ221. See Cross, supra note 214, at 298-300.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 303-04. Cross notes that market valuation has an obvious appeal
because it is both economically efficient and reliable. Id.
226. See id at 310.
227. See id. at 311-12.
228. See id. at 313.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 319-20.
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ual responses to estimate the value of the resource lost because of
the injury to the entire populace. 23 1 Many problems exist with CV,
including the lack of any reality anchor for respondents, the degree
of subjectivity inherent in the polling process, and imperfect information of the respondents. 2 2 Despite these difficulties, CV remains the only known method to measure non-use existence
233
values.
Because of these problems and the relative youth of CV methodology, introducing CV studies into evidence may prove to be difficult To get such studies into evidence, a party must show not
only that the damage valuation is not speculative, but also that the
expert testimony presented satisfies the evidentiary test regarding
the introduction of expert testimony, whether as enunciated in
Daubert v. Merrill Down Pharmaceuticals2 34 or as found in the older
Frye v. United States.23 5 For example, in Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated
Transport Inc.,23 6 the court held that a particular CV study was too
speculative to be introduced to establish the existence value of
steelhead killed by a spill of an agricultural fungicide. 23 7 The study
at issue, however, had not been commissioned or designed to determine the existence of the fish lost due to the spill, but to answer a
more generic inquiry as to the public value in the hypothetical
doubling of the fish population in a nearby watercouse.2 38 Because
of this flaw, Idaho is not particularly helpful in exploring the practical effect of a CV study.
The only other litigation that has addressed this aspect of
NRDs, to the author's knowledge, is In re: Dublin Borough Groundwater Litigation.2 39 In this case, interestingly, the plaintiff borough,
as a NRD trustee under the state CERCLA analog, submitted preliminary objections requesting that CV evidence regarding contaminated groundwater within its trusteeship be excluded under the
231. See
232. See
233. See
value, which

concern.
234.
235.
236.
237.

id.
id.
i& at 320. None of these techniques are able to measure intrinsic
is not surprising, given that intrinsic value is nearly a theological

113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1869 (D. IdahoJan. 24, 1991).
Id., at *55.

238. Id.
239. Penn Ct Comm Pls, Bucks County, No. 89-0006-21-2. This case caption
consolidated two related cases, one a class action, Mannela v Sequa Corp., Penn Ct
Comm Pls, Bucks County, No. 89-1069-21-2, and the other brought by the Borough
of Dublin, Borough of Dublin v. Sun Chemical Corp. Penn Ct Comm Pls, Bucks
County, No. 88-4736-21-2.
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Frye test, which prevails in Pennsylvania. Presumably, the trustee
made this motion in order to exclude studies that revealed or
would reveal that the public placed a low value on this resource.
After the submission of briefs and without turning to the substance
of the issue, the Court denied the preliminary objection from the
bench, noting that a determination on the issue was premature
without the presentation of a particular study.2 4° The evidentiary
hurdles facing the use of CV may prove to be insignificant in the
present legislative climate, but they should not be ignored.
VIII.

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Section 301 (c) of CERCLA directs the President to publish regulations to provide a standard for the assessment of natural resource damages. 24 1 Section 301 (c) (2) mandates the promulgation
of two sets of regulations, the Type A and Type B rules. 242 The
Type A rule creates standard simplified procedures for small releases which require minimal field investigation, and usually consists of a computer-driven, mathematical model.2 43 The Type B
rule covers "large and unusually damaging releases" and contains
site-specific procedures for detailed assessments in individual
cases.2 4 Because of its limited scope, the Type A rule causes far less
controversy than the Type B rule, but both rules have a complex
history of promulgation and challenge.2 45 Before examining the
rules themselves, it helps to have a general understanding of the
assessment process as it will apply to most CERCLA sites.
CERCLA's legislative history indicates that the assessment of
NRDs should begin at the RI/FS stage of the remedial process, and
that planning for rehabilitation of the injured resources should be
made part of the remedial action.2 46 The Type B assessment process, as it survives after Ohio, consists of a five part administrative
240. Id., Nov. 12, 1993 (on file with author).
241. See CERCLA § 301 (c), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c). The President has delegated
this responsibility to the DOI. Exec. Order 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1994)).
242. See CERCLA § 301 (c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (2).
243. See 59 Fed. Reg. 63300 (1994) (proposing Type A rule for coastal and
marine environments).
244. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14262 (1994) (proposing final Type B rule, except for
provisions on the assessment of non-use values).
245. For a discussion of the history of the Type A and Type B rules, see infra
notes 274-84 and accompanying text.
246. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 21 (1985).
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process to assess the value of the injury to the resource. 24 7 The
Type A rule, although it consists of several computer models, incorporates a simplified version of the process mandated by the Type B
4
rule. 8
This process mimics the remedial action process in that it begins with a broad evaluation and continues to focus its inquiry until
a final judgement can be made. The final judgement in an NRD
Assessment, however, is a monetary amount and a Restoration Plan,
rather than a response cost estimate and a Record of Decision. The
2 49
following are the five phases of the Type B assessment.
A.

Preassessment Screen 25 0

The first stage in the DOI scheme is the Preassessment Screen
conducted by the trustee(s) to determine if the hazardous substance release justifies a complete assessment. This screen is completed with a minimal amount of field work, and should only take
several days to complete. Upon completion of the screen, the
trustee makes a determination whether assessment work should
continue. The determination is based upon the preliminary findings that: the release is covered by CERCLA (i.e. was the substance
released a CERCLA "hazardous substance?"); the release could
have injured the natural resource being investigated; the trustee believes that the resource and the injury are significant enough to
warrant further investigation; and the trustee has reason to believe
the potential benefits of performing further assessment outweigh
2 51
the potential CoSts.
B.

Assessment Plan2 52

If the trustee determines that further assessment work should
be completed, the next step is the preparation of an Assessment
247. For a further discussion of the Type B rule, see infra notes 285-317 and
accompanying text.
248. See United States v. Colorado, 880 F.2d 482, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also
43 C.F.R. §§ 11.40-11.41 (1996). These sections set forth the purpose, completion
and costs of Type A assessments. It also details the procedures employed to determine injury, the nature of the injury and damages in coastal and marine environments caused by discharge or release.
249. See Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of Interior, 1992 (on file with author).
250. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.25 (1996).
251. See id. § 11.23 (1996).
252. See id. §§ 11.30-11.35 (1996). These sections set forth the content and
development of the assessment plan, the factors that determine the use of either a
Type A or Type B assessment, the procedures for confirmation of exposure and a
preliminary estimate of damages.
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Plan (Plan). The Plan includes documentation of all decisions
made regarding the methodologies to be applied in the assessment.2 53 The Plan should also ensure that the assessment costs are

reasonable and that the assessment is conducted in a cost-effective
manner. During the Plan, the trustee must conduct a "confirmation of exposure," which serves as a screen to ensure that a nexus
exists between the resource and the hazardous substance as a result
of the release.2 5 4 If this confirmation cannot be made, no further
25 5
assessment actions are taken.
C.

256
Injury Determination

This stage is the third screen of the assessment, and requires
the trustee to establish a link between the release of a hazardous
substance and the actual injury to the natural resource. 257 As part
of this demonstration, the trustee must show the pathway from the
source to the natural resource.2 58 The regulations provide guidance on the proper fate and transport models and precise-pathway
analysis that may be helpful to this effort. 259 For the most efficient
synergistic effect, EPA should coordinate the studies conducted as
part of the RI/FS with this stage of the assessment. 260
D.

Damages Assessment

61

The first thing that the trustee must establish in order to quantify the NRD is a baseline level of services provided by the resource
prior to the injury.2 62 This baseline is then compared to the level of
services that the resource will provide upon the completion of the
253. See id. at 11.31 (discussing what Assessment Plans include).
254. See id. § 11.34.

255. See id. § 11.34(a)(2) (stating that "Type B assessment methodologies
shall be included in the assessment plan only upon meeting the requirements of
this section").
256. See id. §§ 11.61-11.64.
257. See id, § 11.61. This section states that "[t]he authorized official shall...
determine: whether the injury to one or more of the natural resources has occurred; and that the injury resulted from the discharge or release of a hazardous
substance based upon the exposure pathway and the nature of the injury.").
258. See id. § 11.63.
259. See id. § 11.64(c).
260. This stage also incorporates a review of the Assessment Plan to refine the
methodologies and alternatives set forth therein.
261. See 43 C.F.R §§ 11.70-11.73, 43 C.F.RL §§ 11.80-11.84. This phase
actually consists of two separate phases, the Quantification phase, 43 C.F.R
§§ 11.70-11.73, and the Damage Determination phase, 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80-11.84.
262. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.70(b) (describing purpose of the Quantification Phase
as "to quantify the effects of the discharge or release on the injured natural resources for use in determining the appropriate amount of compensation.").
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/3

42

Zaepfel: The Reauthorization of CERCLA NRDs: A Proposal for a Reformulated

1997]

REAUTHORIZATION OF

CERCLA NRDs

remediation. 263 The trustee then uses the most suitable economic
methodologies to translate the reduction in the baseline level of the
services provided by the natural resource due to the injury into a
monetary amount of damages, following the guidelines of the Assessment Plan. This includes an examination of: (a) the costs of
restoration, replacement or acquisition of the equivalent of the injured resource; and/or (b) the lost value of the injured resource
(including both use and non-use values) from the time of injury
264
until the restoration is complete.
At the end of any assessment process, whether it be Type A or
Type B assessment, the trustee documents its conclusions in a Report of Assessment. 265 This report incorporates all plans and submissions it receives from interested parties in response to those
plans and is filed with the appropriate court or administrative body
66
(if legal action is anticipated or ongoing) 2
E.

Post-Assessment

267

After the assessment is complete, the trustee establishes an account into which it will deposit all monies awarded by a court or
received in settlement of its claims. The trustee then develops a
final plan for the restoration, replacement or acquisition of
equivalent resources. This plan necessarily depends on the amount
of money received. The trustee completes this phase by presenting
2 68
the PRPs with a demand for payment.
Several commentators assert that the original section 301 rules
actually impeded the widespread use of NRDs. 269 In particular,
they criticize the original rules for undervaluing the injury done to
natural resources and creating a hopelessly complicated process for
recovery. 270 They also assert that the four year delay in the initial
promulgation of the Type B rule contributed to the hesitancy of
inexperienced trustees. 27 1 This inexperience is compounded by a
263. See id. § 11.70(c).
264. See id. § 11. 7 1 (c) (discussing contents of quantification).
265. See id. § 11.32(c).
266. See id. § 11.18.
267. See id. §§ 11.90-11.93 (identifying the report demand, restoration
account and restoration plan of the post-assessment phase).
268. See id.
269. See Erik D. Olson, Natural Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and
ColoradoDecisions: Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 ENvrL. L. REP. 10551 (1989).
270. See id. at 10553.
271. See Woodward & Hope, supra note 192, at 192, 206; Pilar Okun, The
Revised Natural Resource Damage Assessment Rule: Computationfor Compensation and
Restoration, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 959, 962 (1992).
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lack of legal precedent as well as the inadequacy of economic theory,2 7 2 but may be remedied by publication of the final revised
rules.

2 73

IX.
A.

THE RuLEs, Ohio, Colorado AND Kennecott

A Cacophony of Rulemakings

DOI was, "to put it charitably, relaxed" in its promulgation of
the NRD regulations.2 7 4 Lawsuits initiated by several concerned
parties eventually forced DOI to promulgate the regulations as part
of an unpublished settlement.2 75 Ultimately, on August 1, 1986,
DOI published a final rule concerning the general assessment process for both the Type A and Type B rules and the substantive Type
B rule. 276 DOI published the final Type A rule on March 20,
1987.277 As part of SARA, Congress amended CERCLA to give DOI
six months to conform the rules in the amendments to the NRD
provisions of CERCLA. 2 78 In February 1988, DOI finalized altera279
tions to conform the rules with SARA.
Soon thereafter, industry, state and environmental groups
challenged the Type A and Type B rules in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. These challenges resulted in Colorado v.
Department of Interior,280 regarding the Type A rule, and Ohio v. Department of Interior,28 1 regarding the Type B rule. In Colorado,2 82 the
court denied petitioners argument that the Type A rule was impermissibly narrow, but remanded the rule to DOI for revisions to
comply with the Ohio decision. In Ohio,2 83 the court carefully ex272. See Woodward & Hope, supra note 192, at 192.
273. See id.
274. Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
275. In New Jersey v. Ruckelhaus, No. 84-1688 (D.N.J. 1984), affd mem., 782
F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1986) the district court found that DOI had failed to promulgate the regulations in a timely manner, and later entered a consent order requiring the promulgation the rules.
276. See 51 Fed. Reg. 27674 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93
(1987)).
277. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (1987) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93
(1988)).
278. See CERCIA § 301 (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1). SARA included several of the provisions codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0, including language regarding the rebuttable presumption and the designation of state trustees.
279. See 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988).
280. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
281. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
282. Colorado, 880 F.2d at 481.
283. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 432.
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amined the substance of the Type B rule, upholding the bulk of the
284
rule but remanding several key issues to DOI.
1.

The Ohio Decision

The Ohio decision has served as the watershed CERCLA NRD
case, and confronted fourteen separate issues arising out of the pro28 5
cedural and Type B rule.
a. The "lesser of' Rule
The Type B rule required NRDs to be measured by the lesser
of either: (a) restoration or replacement costs; or (b) the diminution of use values. 286 The Ohio court held that the lessor of rule was
contrary to CERCLA, which states in section 107(f) (1) that the
NRDs "shall not be limited by" the amounts needed to restore the
resources. 28 7 The court interpreted this as an implicit legislative
intent that NRDs should not be less than the restoration costs. 2 88
The court emphasized that the practical consequence of the lesser
of rule would be that lost use values would control the assessment
289
even if they were significantly lower than restoration costs.
b.

The "Committed Use" Requirement

The Type B rule required that, in performing assessments,
trustees limit their examination of use values to "committed uses,"
which were defined as current public uses and those to which a
documented commitment had been established before the release
occurred.2 9 0 For example, a trustee could not assess damages based
upon lost future agricultural services of lands currently protected as
game lands. The court upheld this portion of the rule, but nar284. For a discussion of the propriety of the Ohio decision, see Gregory G.
Garre, CERCLA, NaturalResource Damage Assessments, and the D.C. Circuit'sReview of
Agency Statutory InterpretationsUnder Chevron, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 932 (1990) (discussing propriety of D.C. Circuit's decision in Ohio).
285. The more important issues are summarized below, while the minor issues have been relegated to footnotes. For a further discussion of public ownership of the injured natural resource see supra notes 164-76 and accompanying
text.
286. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441-44.
287. See id. at 442.
288. See id, at 459.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 462. The rule applies to releases of CERCLA hazardous substances as well as oil, but only until NOAA promulgates rules required by the Oil
Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61. See Thomas M. Lenard, Evaluating NaturalResource Damages Claimsfor Settlement of Litigation, 5 Tox. L. R'Rn. 652, 652 n.3 (Oct.
23, 1991).
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rowly construed it, noting that the assessment cannot be limited to
291
committed uses when examining non-use values.
c.

The Hierarchy of Assessment Methods

The Type B rule established a rigid hierarchy of methodologies
to be used in the assessment process.2 92 This hierarchy preferred
market-based techniques of valuation to nonmarket methods, such
as contingent valuation. If the trustee found that the market for
the resource was not reasonably competitive, it could turn to certain uniform appraisal standards. 293 Only if the trustee found that
neither the market nor the appraisal standards were appropriate
could it turn to other methodologies, such as CV.294
The court overturned the hierarchy because it failed to adhere
to the legislative intent.2 95 The court directed DOI to consider a
rule that would allow trustees to compute use value by summing up
the values derived from a variety of methodologies, as long as the
combination of methodologies do not value the service being measured more than once. In addition, the court corrected DOI's assertion that option and existence values were to be used only when
2 96
use values could not be determined.
d.

The Delegation of the Assessment Process to PRPs

The Type B rule authorized the delegation of NRD assessments
to PRPs, drawing protests from state and environmental challengers. The court held that the delegation was reasonable and within
29 7

CERCLA's ambit.

291. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 463. The court stated: "[n]either the statute nor its
legislative history evinces any congressional intent to limit use values to market
prices. On the contrary, Congress intended the damages assessment to capture
fully all aspects of loss." Id. Citing to the Senate Report, the court stated that
"assessment procedures should provide trustees [with] 'a choice of acceptable
damage assessment methodologies to be employed [and should] select the most
accurate and credible damage assessment methodologies available.'" Id.
296. See id at 464. First, the court noted that the provision that DOI pointed
to its interpretation, 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (2), while only speaking of use values, was
modified by a "but not limited to" clause. See id. Second, the court noted that
option and existence values, although non-consumptive uses, derive from human
utility and therefore are to be included as a component of use value, not as a
substitute for it. See id.
297. See id. at 466. The petitioners asserted that 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607() (2) (A)(B) and 9607(f)(2) (C) state that the trustee shall assess damages and that only assessments conducted by trustees receive the benefit of the rebuttable presumption.
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e. Limitation on Recovery of Assessment Costs
The Type B rule limited the recovery of assessment costs by
defining the term "reasonable costs" to include only those costs
where "the anticipated cost of the assessment is expected to be less
than the anticipated damage amount."298 The court held this to be
a reasonable interpretation of the term based upon legislative history which demonstrated a congressional intent that assessments be
cost-effective.2 9
f

The Acceptance Criteria

The rule established a set of "acceptance criteria" to provide
guidance on whether a release actually caused an injury to a particular biological resource (such as a school of fish).3 00 The court
denied several challenges to the criteria and held that the criteria
were a reasonable interpretation of CERCLA.30 1
See id. The court was unpersuaded by this argument, noting that the legislative
history indicated that Congress had anticipated such delegations. See id The court
held that even if the legislative history was ambiguous, the delegation to PRPs was
reasonable and not inconsistent with the statutory purpose. See id.The court also
denied three other minor aspects of the delegation challenged by the petitioners.
See id. at 467-68.
298. 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(ee) (defining reasonable cost).
299. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 468. The court also denied that such an interpretation is inflexible because a trustee that had performed an inexpensive assessment
in anticipation of a small amount of damage could always expand the scope of the
assessment. Id
300. See id See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.62(f)(2), 11.62(f)(3) (1996). Section
11.62(f) (2) states in pertinent part that "[t]he method for determining injury to a
biological resource, as defined in paragraph (f)(1) (i) of this section, shall be chosen based upon the capability of the method to demonstrate a measurable biological response." 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(0 (2). Section 11.62(f)(3) provides that "[u]nless
otherwise provided for in this section, the injury determination must be based
upon the establishment of a statistically significant difference in the biological response between the samples from populations in the assessment area and in the
control area." Id.§ 11.62()(3).
In Ohio, the petitioners claimed that the criteria placed a burden on trustees
that exceeded the common law, contrary to the Congressional intent to liberalize
the standard of causation. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 469. They also argued that, if adequate scientific studies concerning the biological resource at issue had not been
published, trustees would have to undertake such studies themselves without reimbursement from the PRPs, because the studies would likely exceed "reasonable
costs." See id.
301. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 472-73. The court noted that, in some circumstances, the criteria will actually make the trustee's job easier, because a list of
eighteen biological responses to releases that are deemed per se to meet the criteria. See id. The court also pointed out that a failure to meet the criteria does not
invalidate a claim, but merely removes the rebuttable presumption. See id. at 47273.
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g. Punitive Damages
State and environmental petitioners challenged DOI's failure
to draft provisions for the recovery of punitive damages.3 0 2 The
court examined the legislative intent and found that Congress did
not intend for punitive damages to be generally available under
CERCLA. The court, therefore, ruled against the petitioners'
303
argument.
h.

Contingent Valuation

The final issue before the court was the Type B rule's use of CV
to determine the value of an injury to a natural resource when no
market-based or appraisal method was appropriate. The rule defined the CV process as including "all techniques that set up hypothetical markets to elicit an individual's economic valuation of a
natural resource."304 The court noted that at least three formats
are generally available in CV: (1) direct questioning about the
polled individual's willingness to pay; (2) a bidding scenario to determine at what level the individual would retreat from paying for
the natural resource; or (3) a "take it or leave it" format that confronts the individual with a choice of payment.3 0 5 If market-based
and appraisal methodologies were insufficient to determine lost use
values, the Type B rule allowed the use of CV techniques to determine them,3 0 6 in addition to option and existence values.
Industry petitioners argued that CV was inconsistent with common law damage assessment procedures, that CV fails to meet the
statutory requirement for a "best available procedure," and that the
application of the rebuttable presumption to CV was arbitrary and
capricious and violative of due process.3 0 7 The court disagreed that
common law strictures on the use of "speculative" damages applied
to CERCLA, but examined the argument that CV did not meet the
"best available procedure" criteria.30 8 The court noted that DOI
had reviewed numerous technical papers and submissions before
accepting the CV methodology, and had denied the usage of one
CV technique (the "willingness to accept" method) because of its
302. See id. at 474.
303. See id
304. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 475.
305. I&
306. This contingency was struck down in the hierarchy of methods analysis.
For a discussion of the analysis, see supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
307. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 476.
308. See id at 477.
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bias and difficulty in application. 309 The court upheld the use of
CV, and remarked that the industry argument attacked not CV but
CERCLA itself.3 1 0
Industry also argued that CV inherently overstates the true
value of an injured natural resource because it is based on hypothetical situations, not reality.3 11 The court held that the answer to
this problem is relying upon more artful questioning, not invalidation of the use of the methodology.3 12 Because industry failed to
prove that CV as a method produces egregarious results, the court
refused to hold that CV failed to meet the "best available proce313
dure" requirement.
The industry petitioners' argument that the rebuttable presumption's application to CV was arbitrary and capricious rested
upon DOI's alleged failure to respond fully to the comments industry had submitted in response to the rule's Notice of Proposed
Rule-Making.3 1 4 In addition, they asserted that DOI's explanation
of CV application to the measurement of option and existence values was insufficient 3 15 They further complained that the method
was untested and hypothetical, and that the rule did not provide
guidance on when or how CV was to be utilized.3 1 6 The court denied all of these charges, noting DOI had thoroughly investigated
CV, and "analyzed and dealt with" the comments received. The
court's analysis left trustees with considerable flexibility to assess
3 17
NRDs on a case-by-case basis.
309. See id. at 476.
310. See id. at 477.
311. See id.
312. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 477.
313. See id Industry petitioners also challenged the use of CV after an oil spill
or release of a hazardous substance. See i& The court denied this argument due to
the practical impossibility of ascertaining the value of every resource based on the
speculation that a release will occur. Id. at 478.
314. See id. at 479.
315. See id
316. See i& at 478-79.
317. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 480. Industry also asserted several constitutional
challenges to the rule's application of the rebuttable presumption to assessments
based upon CV. See i& With regard to the substantive constitutional claims, the
court noted that, because legislation adjusting economic life is presumed to be
regular, industry had to show that the application of the rebuttable presumption to
CV assessments was arbitrary or irrational. See id. The court summarily denied that
they had met this burden. See id. With regard to the procedural constitutional
claims, industry claimed that the role of the "authorized official" in the NRD assessment process amounted to that of an interested party with the discretionary
power to exclude PRPs from the process, and therefore the power to violate their
procedural due process rights. The court denied this assertion by distinguishing
the facts of the case at bar from the case cited by industry. See iU at 481.
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The Revised Rules

After Colorado and Ohio, DOI promulgated a series of revised
rules to meet guidelines set out by the D.C. Circuit. The revised
Type A rule is being promulgated in phases, with different modeling procedures for different regional ecosystems.3 18 The revised
Type B regulation splits the former rule into two parts, one dealing
with contingent valuation (revised CV rule),319 and one dealing
with all of the other issues remanded to DOI by Ohio (revised Type
B rule),320 The revised CV rule will incorporate a rule to be
promulgated by NOAA concerning CV.321 In 1994, the revised
Type B rule has been published as a final rule, 3 2 but was chal-

lenged by a number of petitioners in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.
C.

The Current Challenges: The Kennecott Copper Decision

On July 16, 1996, the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion on the
challenge to the revised Type B rule.3 23 The challenge to the revised Type B rule consisted of several suits that were consolidated
by the D.C. Circuit. Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation brought
the first suit to challenge the Clinton Administration's withdrawal
from publication in the FederalRegister of a revised Type B rule that
had been officially approved for publication by the Bush Administration.3 24 Publication in the FederalRegisteris necessary for the promulgation of a rule, and Kennecott argued that withdrawal from
publication of an officially approved rule violated procedural provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Freedom of InforThe court also ruled on minor issues. First, the Ten PercentDiscount Rate: challengers objected to DOI's application of a discount rate to calculate the present
value of a future NRD as well as DOI's choice of ten percent as that discount rate.
See 43 C.F.1L § 11.84(e). The court upheld both of these decisions. Ohio, 880 F.2d

at 465. Audit Requirements: petitioners challenged the rule's accounting procedures for funds recovered under a CERCLA NRD claim as beyond DOI's authority.
The court rebuffed this assertion by finding the accounting procedures bore a
rational relationship to the purpose of the enabling legislation. See id. at 474.
318. See 59 Fed. Reg. 63300 (1994).
319. See 59 Fed. Reg. 23098 (1994) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
320. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14262 (1994) (final rule).
321. See 59 Fed. Reg. 23098 (1994) (notice of proposed rulemaking, which
will incorporate NOAA's final CV rule which is currently being proposed, 60 Fed.
Reg. 39804 (1995)).
322. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14262 (1994) (final rule).
323. See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep't the Interior (Kennecott), 88
F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
324. See id. at 1201.
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mation Act and the Federal Register Act.3 25 According to the

company, the withdrawn rule provided guidance that the revised
a2 6
Type B does not.
Kennecott filed its suit in the District Court of the District of
Columbia to convince the District Court of Utah to enter a consent
decree agreed to by the company and the State of Utah in a separate NRD case.3 27 After the district court denied its claims, the

company appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 3 28 The
Court of Appeals consolidated Kennecott with a more general indus329
try challenge to the revised Type B rule.

As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' arguments concerning the impropriety of withdrawing the
Bush Administration's rule.35 0 The court then considered twelve
substantive issues.3 3 1 While the statute of limitations issue will be
addressed in detail later in this article,33 2 the other eleven issues
included:
(1) The Time Bar. Industry petitioners attempted to "reopen" a
number of issues for which the time limit for challenge had already
passed. The court denied their arguments, except as to one particular
provision. 333
325. See id.
326. See id. at 1217-24. For example, the withdrawn rule clarified what damage assessments are "reasonable" and provides guidelines on when it is appropriate
to seek damages for non-use values. See id. at 1224. The revised Type B rule allegedly softens the "reasonableness" language, and completely avoids the issue of
non-use valuation. See id. Clinton Administration officials have asserted that industry favors the withdrawn rule because it placed limits on the use of CV. See id.
327. See id. at 1199. See Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah
1992). For a discussion of the Utah court's grounds for refusing to enter the consent decree, see infra notes 372-80.
328. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1199.
329. See id.
330. See Kennecot4 88 F.3d at 1202. The Court of Appeals held that it did not
possess the authority to order DOI to publish the Bush Administration rule under
the Freedom of Information Act, that the Office of the Federal Register reasonably
interpreted the Federal Register Act to allow agencies to withdraw documents filed
with it during the brief processing period, and that the decision to withdraw the
Bush Administration rule did not provide the court with the authority to review
the action under the CERCLA. See i& at 1202-06. The court also denied the industry petitioners' argument that the revised Type B rule amended or repealed the
Bush Administration rule in a manner contrary to the APA on both factual and
legal grounds. See id. at 1207-09.
331. See id. at 1209-29. The Court of Appeal's table of contents lists thirteen
substantive issues. See id at 1198-99. However, one of the issues, regarding the
acquisition of public lands as a restoration alternative, fits more appropriately
within the discussion regarding the "reopening" of a regulation to challenge.
332. For a discussion of the statute of limitations, see infra notes 360-88 and
accompanying text.
333. See id. at 1213. The excepted provision was 43 C.F.R. § 11.15(a), a part of
the 1994 regulations that authorizes trustees to recover damages for the value of
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(2) Protocols. The alleged failure of DOI to create standards that
were sufficiently demanding to qualify as "protocols" under section
301(c)(2) of CERCLA.334 Despite the industry petitioners' arguments
that the term, "protocol" required the narrow limitation of the trustees'
discretion, the court held that the three challenged
33 5 provisions were sufficiently procedurally confining and standardized.
(3) Cost-effectiveness. DOI required that trustees evaluate cost-effectiveness when examining the various options for the replacement or restoration of an injured natural resource, 33 6 but failed to require that
trustees chose the cost-effective alternative. The court denied the industry petitioners' argument
that this constituted an inappropriate response
33 7
to the Ohio decision.
(4) The Grossly Disproportionate Standard. Industry petitioners asserted that Ohio required DOI to incorporate a requirement that the assessed damages not be "grossly disproportionate" in comparison to the
use value
of the injured resource. The court denied this reading of
33 8
Ohio.
(5) Remedial Consistency. The industry petitioners argued that the
revised Type B rule should require trustees to choose a restoration alternative that is consistent with the remedy chosen by EPA or other authorized entity.3 3 9 The court agreed with the industry petitioners that this
new provision implicitly reopened the issue to challenge. 34° However,
the court found that "the 1994 Regulations sensibly promote coordination, rather than requiring
consistency, between restoration remedies
3
and response actions." 41
(6) Services Provided. In the 1986 regulations, DOI used the concept
of "services" provided by a natural resource to measure the appropriate
level of restoration.38 2 The revised Type B rule seemingly created a new
dichotomy between the services provided and the injured natural resource. 34 Because the court found that this dichotomy was inconsistent
with 3 45
the preamble to the rule, 4 4 it invalidated this portion of the
rule.
(7) CulturalandArchaeologicalResources. The preamble of the revised
Type B rule seemed to authorize trustees to assess damages based upon
the value of the lost use of cultural and archaeological resources.346 The
lost interim services under the Clean Water Act. This provision incorporated the
new 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80-84, and was therefore "constructively" reopened to challenge. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1213-15.
334. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1215. See also CERCLA§ 301(c) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9651(c) (2)(B).
335. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1217. Petitioners challenged 43 C.F.R §§ 11.
82(d), 11.83(b)-(c). See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1215-17.
336. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1217. See also 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(0(1).
337. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1218.
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. See id. at 1219.
341. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 11.31(b) (3)).
342. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1220.
343. See id. (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80(b), 11.81(a)(1)-(a)(2), 11.82(a),
(b) (1) (iii), (c) (1) and 11.83(a) (1)).
344. See id. See also 59 Fed. Reg. at 14262, 14272-23 (1994).
345. See Kennecott 88 F.3d at 1220-21. The court also found that the petitioners' challenge to DOI's definition of the term, "services," was time-barred because
the issue had not been reopened by the revised Type B rule. See id.
346. See id. at 1221. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14262, 14269.
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court concluded that although it could review the preamble, the issue was
not yet ripe because
the harm allegedly caused by the statements was too
47
speculative.M
(8) Indirect Costs. The industry petitioners argued that under the
causation requirement of CERCLA's NRD provisions "indirect costs"
could not be included in damage assessments, as provided by the revised
Type B rule. 348 The court found that DOI's interpretation of the statute
was reasonable and that the rule provided sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy the causal requirement. 49
(9) The Preliminary&timate of Damages. CERCIA allows for the recovery of the reasonable costs of assessing NRDs.3 10 In the revised Type B
rule, DOI used a "preliminary estimate of damages" as a mechanism to
determine the scope of the assessment to be carried out.35 1 This procedural tool allows the trustee to compare the estimated cost of the assessment to the estimated damages, and to assure that the assessment costs
are reasonable.3 5 2 The Industry Petitioners asserted that DOI failed to
adequately explain the decision to use this mechanism, but the court
held that it3 53was a reasonable method and deferred to the DOI's
explanation.
(10) Interim Services. The revised Type B rule provides regulations
for the recovery of NRDs under both CERCLA and the Clean Water Act
(CWA). Industry petitioners challenged DOI's inclusion of services lost
during the course of restoration as recoverable damages under the rule,
arguing that CWA did not authorize these damages under its definition
of "costs of removal" and that DOI should not be allowed to use CERCLA
to override the dear language of CWA.3 5 After finding that the challenge was not time-barred, the court concluded that DOI's interpretation
that these interim values were compensable, was consistent with CERCLA
3 55
and not incompatible with the CWA, and was therefore reasonable.
(11) Priority of Remedies. The State of Montana argued that CERCIA's language indicated that trustees had to prefer restoration, rehabilitation and replacement of the injured natural resource over the
acquisition of equivalent resources. 35 The revised Type B rule did not
set forth a preference along these lines. 3 57 The court, examining DOI's
implicit decision that the statute did not require this preference in light
347. See Kennecott 88 F.3d at 1223.
348. See id. at 1223-24.
349. See id. at 1224.
350. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). Section 107 of
CERCIL holds certain parties who own, possess or transport hazardous substances
liable for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting
from ...

release [of such substances]." Id.

351. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1225.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 1226. The court also found that the challenge based DOI's
failure to break out the components of the assessment for evaluating their reasonableness was time-barred. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id. at 1228. Specifically, the court stated that DOI's "interpretation
fits easily within the broad provisions" of CERCLA and it is not incompatible with
the Clean Water Act.
356. See id. at 1229.
357. See id.
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of the Chevron doctrine,35 8 held that the statute and the legislative history
did not provide explicit direction on this point and that DOI's interpretation was reasonable. In so holding, the court noted that CERCLA's purposes can still be served without establishing such a preference, especially
considering that NRDs serve 3to
complement the other remedial actions
59
completed under the statute.

X.
A.

(ADDITIONAL) AREAS OF CONUSION AND UNCERTAINTY

The Statute of Limitations

The original deadline for the statute of limitations for CERCLA NRDs passed in December 1983, and only four federal NRD
suits were brought 3 6 ° The Washington Post reported a "spasm of
fingerpointing" among federal agency officials seeking to avoid
blame for the lack of administrative commitment.36 ' As part of
SARA, Congress amended the statute of limitations. As amended,
section 113(g) (1) sets the general statute of limitations, which applies at non-NPL sites, for CERCLA NRDs at three years after the
later of the following: (A) the date of the discovery of the loss and
its connection with the release in question (discovery prong); and
(B) the date on which DOI promulgates the assessment regulations
required by section 301 (c) (regulatory prong).3 62
Section 113(g) (1) carves out a huge exception to this general
rule for NPL sites, federal facilities identified pursuant to section
120 of CERCLA, and any vessel or facility at which "a remedial action under this chapter is otherwise scheduled . . ."m For these
facilities, section 113(g) sets the statute of limitations at three years
after the completion of the remedial action, excluding operation
and maintenance activities. Section 113(g) (1) also prohibits the fil358. See id. See Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The Chevron doctrine states that a statute should
be construed to effectuate the expressed intent of the legislature where possible,
but absent a legislative expression of intent, deference should be given to the interpretation of an agency charged with its execution. See id,
359. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1231.
360. See Breen, Citizen Suits, supra note 108, at 862.
361. See id. (citing Toxic Waste Claims Deadline Missed, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17,
1983, at Al).
362. CERCLA § 113(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 1 3 (g)(1).
363. Id. This provision states in pertinent part:
With respect to any facility listed on the National Priories List (NPL),
any Federal facility identified under section 9620 of this title (relating to
Federal facilities), or any vessel or facility at which a remedial action
under this chapter scheduled, an action for damages under this chapter
is otherwise must be commenced within 3 years after completion of the
remedial action (excluding operation and maintenance activities) in lieu
of the dates referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B)....
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ing of NRD claims prior to sixty days after the federal or state
364
trustee notifies the President and the PRP of an intent to file suit,

and before the selection of a remedial action if the President is "diligently proceeding" with an RI/FS.3 65
Because DOI promulgated the section 301 (c) regulations haphazardly, courts have interpreted the non-NPL statute of limitations
differently. In United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. (Montrose
Chem.), 366 the district court found that the plaintiff trustees had
failed to file within the confines of the non-NPL statute of limitations. The trustees brought a suit to recover CERCLA NRDs for
injuries to the Southern California Bight (an area of land submerged under the Pacific Ocean).367 These injuries resulted from
contamination from two separate sources, DDT discharges from a
manufacturing plant in Montrose and PCB discharges from a plant
36
owned by Westinghouse. 8
With regard to the regulatory prong of the non-NPL rule,36 9
the district court, framing the issue as a "purely legal one," inquired
whether Congress intended the limitations period to run from the
time the Type B regulations were promulgated or from the time
when both the Type A and the Type B regulations were promulgated.3 7 0 The court found that the legislative history indicated that
the promulgation of the Type B rule was intended to trigger the
running of the period.3 7 1 However, the court also stated that the
statutory language provided that the limitations period should run
from the promulgation of the rule "applicable" to the particular
364. This notice of intent to file suit originates in CERCILA § 113(1), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(1).

365. SeeCERCLA § 113(g) (1) 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13 (g)(1). Section 1 13(g)(1) provides that:
In no event may an action for damages under this chapter with respect to
such a vessel or facility be commenced (i) prior to 60 days after the Federal or State natural resource trustee provides to the President and to the
potentially responsible party a notice of intent to file suit, or (ii) before
selection of the remedial action if the President is diligently proceeding
with a remedial investigation and feasibility study under section 9604(b)
of this title or section 9620 of this title (relating to Federal facilities).
Id Section 113(g)(1) also expressly provides that the limitations above do not
apply to suits filed on or before October 17, 1986. See id
366. 883 F. Supp. 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
367. See id. at 1397.
368. See id.

369. See CERCLA § 113(g)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1) (A).
370. See Montmse Chem., 883 F. Supp. at 1339.
371. See id. at 1402.
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release. 372 The opinion fails to reveal the court's preference between these two holdings.
With regard to the discovery prong of the non-NPL rule,3 7 3 the
district court found that the plaintiff trustees had the requisite
knowledge of the injury prior to the promulgation of the Type B
regulations based upon numerous reports of the damage and its
sources. 3 74 The court followed precedent that widespread knowledge of information among lower echelon governmental employees is imputed to the higher levels, the "trustee," when employees
with the knowledge have a duty to transmit the information to their
superiors.3 75 The court also denied the plaintiffs' argument that
DOI's interpretation of the date of discovery, based on the signing
of the NRD Preassessment Screen Determination, was supported by
3 76
CERCLA or its legislative history.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's rationale with regard to the regulatory prong.3

77

Look-

ing at section 113(g) (1) (B) of CERCLA, the Court of Appeals held
that the clear intent of the provision is that the statute of limitations
began to run upon the promulgation of both the Type A and Type
B rules.3 78 In so holding, the court specifically rejected the argu-

ments that the language of the section was ambiguous, that DOI
could manipulate the statute of limitations by continuing to promulgate the rules in increments, and that the subsequent invalidation of the rules in Ohio and Colorado has any bearing on the
3 79

issue.

The court also denied that the legislative history indicated that
Congress intended the promulgation of the Type B rules alone to
set the date of the running of the statute of limitations.3 8 0 The
court further rejected the defendants' arguments that the fact that
the Type A rules did not apply to the case at bar had any relevance
to the statute of limitations, that the DOI's continued failure to promulgate all of the Type A rules made the Trustees' arguments absurd, and that Congress intended to establish the running of the
372. See id. at 1399.
373. Se CERCLA § 113(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1)(B).
374.
375.
376.
377.
Cir. Jan.
378.
379.
380.

See Montrose Chem., 883 F. Supp. at 1403-05.
See id. at 1405.
See id. at 1406.
See California v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 704 (9th
17, 1997).
See id. at *12-13.
See id. at *15-17.
See id. at *17-22.
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statute of limitations by setting a deadline for the promulgation of
the rules. 38 '
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit in Californiav. Montrose looked
to the guidance of the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of Interior' 2 The
revised Type B rule attempted to set the date for the regulatory
prong as the later of the dates on which the final rules for the Type
A and Type B regulations are published pursuant to Colorado and
Ohio.38 3 In Kennecott, industry petitioners argued that DOI did not
have the authority under CERCLA to define the term "promulgated." m4 Further, they argued that DOI could not alter the clear
intent of CERCLA (under step one of Chevron), and that DOI's interpretation of the date was unreasonable (under step two of Chevron) because it enabled the agency to indefinitely postpone the
running of the statue of limitations by stalling the rules
identified m 5
After noting that whether the agency has the power to interpret the term "promulgated" is a close call, the court declined to
decide the issue, relying on the failure of the interpretation under
Chevrn.36 With regard to the first step of the Chevron analysis, the
court decided that the congressional intent was not sufficiently
clear to provide it with any guidance.3m7 Proceeding to the second
step of the Chevron analysis, the court held that DOI's attempt to
define "promulgated" as an uncertain date in the future, possibly
several years away, was simply too far of a stretch to be reasonable.3 8 For this reason, the court rejected DOI's attempt to base
the statute of limitations on the revisions of the regulations pursuant to Ohio and Colorado.
B.

The Fifty Million Dollar Cap

Section 107(c) (1) (D) of CERCLA limits NRD liability to fifty
million dollars per release or incident involving a release from a
381. See id. at *25-27.
382. See California v. Montrose, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 704, at *26. See also
KennecoU Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep't of Interior,88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For a
discussion of Kennecott see supra notes 314-50 and accompanying text.
383. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e).
384. See Kennecot, 88 F.3d at 1210-11.
385. See id.
386. See id. at 1213.
387. See id. at 1211.
388. See id. at 1212-13. The court held that "the date under which the regulations were promulgated was, at the latest, the date on which the Type A regulations
were published in the Federal Register." Id.
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facilityS89 In Montrose, the district court interpreted section
107(c)(1)(D) to mean that the liability of a group of defendants
alleged to be liable as owners and operators of a particular facility
90
was limited to fifty million dollars, as a group.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that, while the district
court had not explained its reasoning in its written opinion, it had
stated two grounds for this holding in court: (1) all of the releases
from the facility in question constituted one "incident involving release;" and (2) the site constituted one "facility" and therefore the
statute limited liability to fifty million dollars from all releases from
8 91
the facility.
The court examined the context of the phrase "incident involving release" and the legislative history of CERCLA and held that the
term means "an occurrence or series of occurrences of relatively
short duration involving a single release or a series of releases all
resulting from or connected to the event or occurrence." 92 Therefore, a series of releases over a long period of time do not necessarily fall within the confines of one "incident involving release" and
8 98
the fifty million dollar cap may or may not apply.
The court then turned to the district court's second rationale.
Beginning with the statutory language of section 107(c) (1), the
court noted that CERCLA set forth several categories of sources of a
release and set different caps on the liability arising from releases
from those source categories.8 94 From this point, the court summarily jumped to the holding that one's liability for each release is
capped at a different amount depending on the source category
and that the district court's interpretation would render the clause
8 95
linking the liable party to each specific release meaningless.
389. See CERCLA § 107(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1). Section 107(c)(1)
reads:
[T] he liability under [42 U.S.C. § 9607] of an owner or operator or other
responsible person for each release of a hazardous substance or incident
(D) for
involving release of a hazardous substance shall not exceed -...
...any facility other than those specified in subparagraph (C) of this
paragraph, the total of all costs of response plus $50,000,000 for any damages under this subchapter.
Id. This liability cap is removed if the release resulted from an act of willful misconduct or willful negligence, a violation of applicable safety standards or regulations, or the PRP fails to reasonably cooperate with the response action. See id.
§ 107(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (2).
390. See Montrose Chem., 883 F. Supp. at 1403.
391. See California v. Montrose, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 704, *28.
392. Id at *35.
393. See id.
394. See id. at *35-36.
395. See id, at *36-37.
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Therefore, the court rejected the district court's limitation on the
fifty million dollar cap.
While not erring on the side of excess language, this holding is
sound. First, the definition of "release"3 96 or the term "incident
involving release" could be interpreted to mean that a continuing
release is comprised of multiple individual releases, multiplying the
fifty million dollar cap. Second, the statutory language indicates
that the cap is based upon the liability of each defendant, not each
facility. Other than Montrose, at the time of this writing, there is no
caselaw on the NRD cap provision. However, trustees and PRPs are
likely to continue to argue the meaning of the NRD cap provision.
C. Pre-Enactment Damages
Recognizing that injury to natural resources might result in unduly large claims, Congress provided in section 107(f) that there
can be no recovery for NRDs "where such damages and the release
of hazardous substances from which such damages resulted occurred wholly before" the enactment of CERCLA.3 97 Because injuries to natural resources tend to be continuing, courts have had
difficulties interpreting the meaning of the seemingly simple
provision.
In In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings
(Acushnet I),398 the court held that NRDs "occur" when an entity
loses use or enjoyment of the natural resource or incurs costs due
to the injury.3 99 It recognized that where NRDs are divisible, plaintiffs cannot recover for that portion occurring prior to enactment
of CERCLA.400 When the NRDs are not divisible and releases that
caused the damages continued after enactment of CERCLA, the
court found that the trustees could recover the NRDs in their entirety.4° 1 Moreover, the court held that the defendant bears the
396. See CERCIA § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. 9601(22). A release is defined as: "...
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including
the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)," with certain exclusions. Id
397. Id. § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 107(0. See also, Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of
New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 1988) (suggesting non-retroactivity
of natural resource claim indicates Congress intended to limit such claims as to
time and eligibility for recovery).
398. 716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989).
399. See id. at 684. Damages caused by diminution in property value do not
have to be actualized. Id.
400. See id. at 685.
401. See id. at 686. (citations omitted).
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burden of proving that the damages are divisible and the portion of
the damages that occurred prior to enactment. 4° 2 For instance, aesthetic damage and "latent" or undiscovered injuries (which are incapable of assessment because they are not known) are examples of
4 °3
indivisible damages.
D.

Prohibition On Double Recovery

In 1986, Congress added language to section 107(f) (1) of CERCLA prohibiting double recovery for NRDs. 404 This provision limits
a trustee from seeking CERCLA NRDs for an injury to a natural
resource within its trust when another trustee has already won or
settled a CERCLA NRD claim based upon that same injury. To
avoid this defense, the second trustee must base its claim either on
a different natural resource injury or on a different release than the
first trustee. However, because the terms "release" 4°5 and "natural
resource" 4 ° 6 are subject to differing interpretations, even this strategy is risky.
E.

The Rebuttable Presumption

While not required to follow their direction, a trustee that performs an assessment under the DOI regulations is given the effect
of a rebuttable presumption of damage when reviewed by a court or
administrative body. 4° 7 The rebuttable presumption creates several
problems. First, section 107(f) (2) (C) of CERCLA, which creates
the presumption, speaks only in terms of federal and state trust402. See id. at 687.
403. See id. at 686.

404. See CERCIA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).

Section 107(f)(1)

reads: "there shall be no double recovery under this chapter for natural resource
damages, including the costs of damage assessment or restoration, rehabilitation,
or acquisition for the same release and natural resources." Id.
405. For a discussion of the definition of "release," see supra note 396 and
accompanying text.
406. For a discussion of the definition of "natural resource" see supra note 67
and accompanying text.
407. CERCLA § 107(f)(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2) (C). Section 107()
(2) (C) provides:
Any determination or assessment of damages to natural resources for
purposes of [CERCIA] and [the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321]
made by a Federal or State trustee in accordance with the regulations
promulgated under [42 U.S.C. § 9651(c), the Type A and Type B rules]
shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of
the trustee in any administrative or judicial proceeding under [CERCLA]
or [33 U.S.C. § 1321].
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ees. 4o8 Commentators disagree whether, if a municipality could
bring suit for NRDs without gubernatorial designation, it would be
entitled to the rebuttable presumption. 4°9 However, the presumption appears to apply to municipalities if they operate under gubernatorial delegation or if the reviewing court follows the Boonton
analysis of the definition of "state."4 10 Some commentators also assert that tribal trustees would receive the presumption if they completed an assessment under the DOI niles.4 11 However, section
126(a) of CERCLA lists the applicable provisions where Indian
tribes are to be treated as a "state," and it fails to cite section
412
107(f) (2) (c).
Commentators also disagree over the effect of following the
regulations. Menefee asserts that the rebuttable presumption will
aid in ending challenges to NRD assessments. 4 13 Huguenin asserts
that following the regulations closely may prove to be too expensive
4 14
for most trustees, especially if CV methods become a mainstay.
XI.

SETrLING

CERCLA NRD CLAIMs

The controversy surrounding the political and regulatory aspects of NRD often overshadows developments in the judicial forum. However, following the guide set out in United States v.
Cannons Eng'g Corp.,4 15 reviewing courts have begun to examine
proposed NRD settlements with a discerning eye. In Utah v. Kenne408. See id.
409. See Anton P. Giedt & Gordon J. Johnson,

PROSECUTING NRD CLAIMS,
PRESENTED AT NATURAL REsouRCE DAMAGES CLAIMS AND LITIGATION CONFERENCE

(April 1991) (municipalities do not receive rebuttable presumption). But see,
Maraziti, supra note 126, at 10039 (municipalities do and should receive rebuttable
presumption).
410. For a discussion of municipal trustees and the Boonton analysis, see supra
notes 108-22.
411. See Du Bey & Grijalva, supra note 108, at 178.
412. See CERCLA § 126(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (listing specific instances
where American Indian tribes should be afforded essentially same treatment as

State). The National Congress of American Indians and the Affiliated Tribes of
Northwest Indians have proposed that the reauthorization of CERCLA include an
amendment which explicitly grants the rebuttable presumption to tribal trustees.
Major Tribal Group, supra note 113, at 21.

413. See Mark Menefee, Recoveyy for Natural Resource Damages under Superfund:
The Role of the Rebuttable Presumption, 12 EwrrL. L. REP. 15057 (Nov. 1982).
414. See Presentation by Michael T. Huguenin, PADER, Harrisburg, PA, April
6, 1994. Mr. Huguenin is an economist and President of Industrial Economics,

Inc.
415. 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990). Cannonsrequires the reviewing court to
find a proposed consent decree to be "reasonable, fair, and consistent with the
purposes that CERCIA is intended to serve." Id, (citations omitted).
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the district court rejected a proposed consent decree
that would have settled a $129 million NRD claim made by the state
4 17
trustee, for contaminated groundwater, for $11.7 million.
After noting that the settlement of NRDs before completing
the remediation is like putting the "cart before the horse," 4 18 the
court held that there were at least three reasons why the consent
decree could not be entered. The first and second reasons seemingly relied on section 1220) (2) of CERCLA, 419 which allows federal
trustees to enter into covenants not to sue for NRDs only if the PRP
agrees to undertake appropriate action necessary to protect and restore the injured natural resource. The state's failure to provide a
sufficient foundation for its determination that the groundwater
could not be feasibly restored, and its failure to require substantial
protection from future contamination of its natural resources failed
to meet the protection and restoration requirements. The court
noted that the plain language of section 1220) (2) was limited to
federal trustees, but stated that the purposes of CERCLA required
that both federal and state trustees be held to this standard when
the NRD settlement precedes the remediation. 42 0
The third reason arose from the state's sole reliance on market
values to calculate damages, as it failed to adequately assess the extent of present and future injuries to the state's natural resources. 4 2 ' The court held that this method of valuation ignored
the Ohio decision, which mandated the inclusion of option and
existence values in a primafacie assessment. 42 Moreover, the state
failed to include in the assessment costs of containment of the
plume of contamination and source3 control, apparently in reliance
42
upon some future action by EPA.
Cott Corp.,416

416. 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah 1992), appeal denied, 14 F.3d 1489 (10th Cir.
1994).
417. See id. at 572.

418. Despite the fact that NRDs are partially based upon residual injury, NRD
claims are sometimes settled before the site remediation is complete or the ROD is
even signed. Some commentators assert that this practice should be limited. See
Stephen C. Jones, Recent Assessment Regulations from Interior DepartmentIndicate that
NRDs Pose New Liabilitiesfor Industy, NATL. L.J., Aug. 8, 1994, at B4, B10 n.4 (citing
Wnius D. BRIGHTON, THE NEW RuLEs FOR NRD ASSESSMENTS AND CLAIMS UNDER
CERCLA AND OPA 618, 621 (1994)).

419. See CERCLA § 1220)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 96220) (2).
420. See Utah v. Kennecott, 802 F. Supp. at 569 n.20.
421. See id.
422. See id. at 571.
423. See id. The court stated that "it appears that the State adopted too narrow interpretation of use value by equating such with market value only." Id.
Therefore, the proposed settlement failed to "capture fully all aspects of the loss."
Id. (citing Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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Utah required not only that the substantive mandates of CERCLA be met, but also that the parties enter into evidence enough
technical detail on both the proposed remediation and the valuation of the resource so that the court is able to determine the proposed settlement's appropriateness. One court has gone further,
explicitly requiring that evidence of the valuation of the injured
natural resource be entered into the record for review. In United
States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of CaL (Montrose) 4 24 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the approval of a proposed
consent decree between a number of trustees and local governmental and quasi-governmental entities (government defendants) . 4 25
Although the court of appeals noted that its role involved considerable deference, it held that the district court had abused its discretion by entering the consent decree without any evidence of the
total NRD assessment. 426
Although the Special Master had vouched for the settlement's
fairness, the court of appeals held that a settlement could not be
approved without some indication of the relationship between settlement amount and the total NRD amount. 427 The court noted

that such a showing is especially important where joint and several
liability did not attach and collection of the settlement amount appears tenuous. 42 In so holding, the court refuted the district
court's assertion that CERCLA's policy to facilitate early settlements
created any additional deference to the reviewing court.4 2 9
While the requirement to introduce evidence of the assessment may not seem problematic, it can present difficulties when no
actual assessment has been completed and the parties are relying
on a thumbnail sketch of the injury. Such cases are common when
no or little permanent injury has been discovered that can be
traced to a particular release or site and the PRP is demanding a
total "walk" from the site. In such a case, the trustee is receiving an
424. 50 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1995).
425. See id. at 743-46. The Montrose case involved four distinct groups of plain-

tiffs, which the Special Master assigned to the case had directed to negotiate with

the plaintiff trustees separately and subject to a confidentiality agreement. The
government defendants and another group had arrived at settlements with the
plaintiff trustees, both of which had been approved by the district court. Only the
settlement involving the government defendants was appealed. See id
426. See id. at 746-47.
427. See id. at 747. The court held that reliance on the special master's recommendation cannot be so complete that it replaces the court's obligation to independently scrutinize the settlement terms. See i&.
428. See id,
429. See Montrose, 50 F.3d at 748.
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amount, usually relatively small, in order to comprise a claim it
never would have initiated. Some critics may assail this practice as
"legal blackmail," nevertheless the issue is usually introduced by the
PRP, who wants the assurance that they will never have to worry

about the case again.
Decisions rejecting proposed NRD settlements do not account
for the bulk of NRD settlements, 430 so their philosophical value may
outweigh their practical consequences. Some of the concerns
raised by such cases, such as the "protect and restore" requirement
in Utah, may be avoided by skillful drafting of covenants not to sue
and the accompanying reopeners. However, in cases where several
PRPs or groups of PRPs have been contentiously fighting the
remediation or the NRDs, the trustees should review these opinions
and craft their case so as to avoid successful third-party appeals.
Such efforts should include showing how the settlement protects
and restores the injured natural resource, and introducing some evidence of the total NRD value.
XII.

How GovERNMENT

TRUSTEES USE

CERCLA NRDs

A. When Are NRDs Sought?
On a practical level, government trustees do not always seek
CERCLA NRDs, primarily because of the difficult legal, policy and
economic issues that accompany these claims. Government trustees
will tend to seek CERCLA NRDs when significant natural resources
are injured and complete clean-up is neither technically feasible
nor cost effective. 43 ' In addition, NRD suits may potentially arise
when the clean-up of effected media does not restore damaged natsugural resources, such as biota, fisheries and the like. 43 2 Habicht
433
gests that such situations will probably not be very common.
B.

The Value of the NRD Claim in CERCLA Negotiations

Despite Congressional goals, the process required by CERCLA
is by no means quick. Taking a site through the entire remediation
process takes an average of a little over eight years. 4M During this
430. Research at the time of this writing revealed only the two cases, Kennecott
and Montrose, both discussed earlier in this Article.
431. See Habicht, supra note 20, at 5.
432. See id.
433. See id, "The policy should be to evaluate claims carefully and bring actions for natural resource damages only where restoration or replacement, in some
form, advances or contributes to the overall response to the hazardous substance
contamination." Id.
434. See Church & Nakamura, supra note 33, at 7-8.
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time the PRPs typically will fight against more stringent clean-up
standards and methods, which would increase their potential liability during cost recovery. 43 5 For example, a PRP may petition EPA to
waive a state clean-up standard or ARAR, such as groundwater
remediation standards, based on a statutory waiver, 4s6 such as technical impracticability. 43 7 Because NRD claims.aim to compensate
the public for damages to a natural resource, they create a disincentive for PRP's to attempt to convince EPA and the state to agree to
lower clean-up standards. This is because PRPs, after all, will bear
the financial burden of compensating the public for the greater
residual contamination left by a reduced standard. In negotiations,
a particular trustee's ability to effectively present its NRD claim to a
court increases both settlement amounts obtained from PRPs for
NRD claims as well as the willingness of PRPs to accept more stringent standards.
XIII.

ARE CERCLA NRDS A SLEEPING GIANT?

During recent Senate hearings on NRDs, Senator Bob
Smith,43 8 agreed with witness' statements that NRDs are the "sleeping giant" of Superfund because of the lack of information available
on the extent of NRD damages at Superfund sites.43 9 Since the
1980s, legal commentators have predicted that claims for CERCLA
NRDs would become central to Superfund litigation. 44° Recently, it
appears that these predictions may be true. While cost recovery actions often push NRDs out of the spotlight,4 1 PRPs have begun to
push for covenants not to sue that include NRDs in consent decrees
and agreements. In addition, recent publication of several rules by
DOI44 and NOAA443 markedly improve the chance that these
435. See Mazmanian & Morell, supra note 18, at 45.
436. See CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(C)(iv)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(C)(iv)(4).
437. See id. § 121 (d) (2) (C) (iv) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (2) (C) (iv) (4) (C).
438. Republican of New Hampshire.
439. See Waste Control and Risk Assessment: Hearing before the Senate
Comm. Env't and Public Works, Subcommittee on Superfund, 104th Cong.,
(1995) (statement of Senator Bob Smith, Chairman).
440. See Habicht, supra note 20, at 1.
441. NRD settlements amount to roughly one-tenth of cost revery settlements.
As of April 1995, federal agencies had settled 98 NRD cases for an estimated total
of $106 million. Through fiscal year 1994, the federal government had settled cost
recoveries amounting to an estimated $ 10.2 billion. Waste Control and Risk Assessment: Hearing before the Senate Comm. Env't and Public Works, Subcommittee on Superfund, 104th Cong., (1995) (statement of Keith 0. Fultz, Asst.
Comptroller General, General Accounting Office).
442. See 59 Fed. Reg. 1424 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 23098 (1994).
443. See 58 Fed. Reg. 4601 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 1062 (1994).
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claims will become an integral part of CERCLA negotiations and
litigation. Congress is currently examining the impact and role of
CERCLA NRDs. This gives trustees a strong incentive to moderate
their lobbying and prosecutorial activities, if only to convince Congress that they can be trusted with the CERCLA NRD provisions.
Several structural features also limit the ability of trustees to
pursue CERCLA NRDs. States have complained for a long time
that they do not have the financial resources to conduct the detailed assessments necessary to evaluate possible NRD claims. 4 " In
addition, the trustees designated by the President and governors
have other competing responsibilities that reduce energy available
for the pursuit of NRDs. Also, the fact that state (and possibly federal) 44 5 program personnel are reluctant to destroy working relationships with PRPs in order to pursue monies in addition to cleanup costs may further impede pursuit of NRDs. Even after the publication of the final NRD rules, these problems will impede the widespread filing of NRD claims.
XV.

REAUTHORIZATION IN THE

104TH

CONGRESS

The 103d Congress avoided the NRD issue via a tightly-controlled system of negotiations between interested parties. 446 In the
104th Congress, the NRD issue was one that doomed Republican
efforts at Superfund reform. The two central Republican players in
the CERCLA reauthorization during the 104th Congress were Representative Michael Oxley" 7 and Senator Robert Smith. 448 Both issued position papers concerning their goals for Superfund reform
444. See Fox, supra note 172, at 540 n.129 (citations omitted).
445. On the federal level, the organizational divide between the Department
ofJustice (DOJ) and EPA may lessen this reluctance. EPA attorneys, who interact
with EPA technical staff, may push for less dependence on NRDs, primarily to focus governmental attention on the Superfund remedial process. DOJ attorneys
view the federal government as a whole as their client, not the discrete EPA programs, so these concerns may go unheeded. DOJ attorneys are therefore left with
multiple clients and possibly conflicting interests. See Warren L. Dean, Jr. & Lara
M. Bernstein, Paying for Natural Resource Destruction, Legal Times Supplement,
May 13, 1996, at 6, 10.
446. The compromise bill in the 103d Congress resulted from a tightly controlled series of negotiations first organized by the National Commission of
Superfund, and was shepherded by an EPA advisory group. See Rena I. Steinzor,
The Reauthorization of Superfund: Can the Deal of the Centuy be Saved?, 25 ENvrL. L.
REP. 10016, 10018 (Jan. 1995).
447. Republican of Ohio, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Committee.
448. Republican of New Hampshire, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee.
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changes. These proposals offered a dramatic departure from the
past evolution of CERCLA NRDs and would have given industry an
advantage in future NRD suits. 449
In the newly-elected 105th Congress, the issue of Superfund
reform will continue to be contentious. The Republican leadership
in the Senate has already introduced a comprehensive Superfund
reform bill, Senate Bill 8, to begin the debate. 450 Senate Bill 8's
NRD title, Title 7, attempts to correct some of the perceived unfairness of the CERCLA NRD provisions. 45 1
The bill places a limitation in section 107(f) of CERCLA that
only allows a Trustee's restoration or replacement of an injured natural resource or acquisition of a substitute resource to proceed if
the project is "technologically feasible from an engineering perspective at a reasonable cost and consistent with all known or anticipated response actions at or near the facility." 452 While seeking a
laudatory goal, the language of this limitation provides little comfort because its terms are not defined. Technological feasibility, as
many environmental practitioners know from PRP attempts to
waive groundwater clean-up standards, is a truly malleable term,
subject to deference from the courts. In addition, in the Superfund
context, the term "reasonable" loses definition when compared to
remedial actions with $100,000,000 price tags. A court reviewing
whether the cost of a Trustee's chosen project is reasonable when
compared to remedial actions, or other projects likely to be examined during the NRD assessment, is unlikely to evolve beyond
the "shocks to the conscience" analysis taught in first-year law
school classes.
Senate Bill 8 further modifies the language of section 107, limiting the amount of CERCLA NRD liability to an amount equal to
the total of reasonable costs of restoration or replacement of the
injured resource or acquisition of an equivalent replacement resource. 453 More importantly, this provision explicitly prohibits recovery for impairment of lost non-use values.4
In addition, the

449. SeeOpen Letter, Rep. MichaelJ. Oxley, July 17, 1995, at 10; INSIDE E.P.A
Special Report, June 29, 1995, at 8 (Sen. Smith's proposal).
450. See S. 8, 105th Cong. tit. VII (1997).
451. See id.
452. S. 8, § 701(3).
453. See S. 8, § 703(3) (B).
454. See id

WEEKLY REPORT,
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provision attempts to clarify the existing limitations on double re455
covery and retroactive application of NRD liability.
The value of the clarifications on double recovery and retroactive application do not seem, by their terms, to offer much more
than the original provision. 4-1 The limitations on the liability, however, offer the regulated community a glimpse of certainty, especially because they limit Trustees' recovery to real-world objectives.
With a focus on restoration projects and the elimination of non-use
values from the assessments, a PRP can be assured that the trustees
are not simply inflating their claims or using questionable eco7
nomic valuation techniques to obtain optimum recoveries.4
Section 702 of Senate Bill 8 adds to this new certainty by limiting trustees, to the extent practicable, to assessment methodologies
that conform to the section 301 (c) rulemaking and "generally ac45 8
cepted scientific and technical standards and methodologies."
Further, the provision requires that the assessment rely on facilityspecific information, rather than regional data or generic estimations of the value of a resource. 45 9 While this process will make the
trustees' task of valuing an injury even more onerous, PRPs may be
less resistant to an assessment revealing that the injury at a specific
site served as the basis for the assessment. Additionally, section 702
also contains a limitation on the costs of an assessment that a
trustee may recover that eliminates any costs of conducting a CV
assessment.
The lack of definition of "generally accepted scientific and
technical standards and methodologies" in section 702, is particularly bothersome given the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,46° which altered the traditional Fye v.
United States4 1 rule regarding the introduction of expert scientific
opinion into evidence. The Frye test only allowed scientific evidence that was generally accepted in the relevant scientific commu455. See id. Section 703(a) states: "[b]oth response actions and restoration
measures may be implemented at the same facility, or to address releases from the
same facility. Such response actions and restoration measures shall not be inconsistent with another and shall be implemented to the extent praciticable, in a coordinated and integrated manner." Id.
456. See CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f).
457. The term "nonuse value," however, has not been defined, which could
lead to difficulty as assessments are conducted.
458. S. 8, § 702(a).
459. See i&.
460. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
461. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/3

68

Zaepfel: The Reauthorization of CERCLA NRDs: A Proposal for a Reformulated

1997]

REAUTHORIZATION OF

CERCLA NRDs

427

nity.462 The Daubert opinion liberalizes this rule by creating a fourpart test to examine scientific evidence. 46 While the details of the
distinction between the two tests need not be examined here, the
provision implies that NRD valuation somehow differs from other
scientific evidence in terms of its importance, such that the more
stringent Frye test is more appropriate.
Obviously, the elimination of recovery for CV assessments will
serve as a nearly insurmountable barrier to the performance of
these surveys by trustees. Together with the prohibition on recovery for non-use values, the Senate Republicans are sending a strong
message that questionable economic methodologies are not acceptable. While this decision is completely justifiable from a policy perspective, especially given the astronomic fears of the regulated
community, one should not look to legal or economic logic for further support. The fact that an injury is difficult to value does not
mean it did not occur, or that an entity or a market segment did
not profit by shifting the cost of that injury to the public domain.
One caveat, however, derives from the federalist system. Although
Congress may eliminate these hotly-contested economic devices
from CERCLA, states do not have to follow suit. State statutes
analogous to CERCLA will not change by the passage of a
Superfund reform bill, and the vestiges of CV and non-use injury
may still survive in these little-used statutes well after these issues
have been resolved at the federal level.
The remainder of section 702 of Senate Bill 8 provides little
ground for controversy. It forces trustees to allow the payment of
NRDs over a period of years appropriate to the number of years
over which the injury occurred, and considering the amount of the
damages, the financial ability of the PRP and the pace of expenditures for the restoration, replacement or acquisition. 464 It allows,
but does not require, the designation of a lead trustee and the creation of an administrative record. 465 It also curiously requires that
the Administrator of EPA, as opposed to the President or the Secretaries of the Department of Interior and Department of Commerce,
to promulgate a regulation regarding public participation in the
assessment process. 466
462. See generally, Donald A. Brown & Patrick H. Zaepfel, The Law and Scientific
Uncertainty in Environmental Matters 380-82, in ScIENTIRc UNCERTAINTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING (John Lemons, ed. 1996).

463.
464.
465.
466.

See id
See S. 8, § 702(a).
See id.
See id.
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The section also amends section 301 (c) of CERCLA regarding
the NRD rulemakings to require that the various rules be adjusted
to fit the new NRD paradigm. In addition to focusing the rules on
restoration alternatives and appropriate criteria for the setting of
schedules for NRD payments, section 702 of Senate Bill 8 requires
the President to identify the "Best Available Procedures" to determine the reasonable costs of restoration and assessment and to take
into account natural recovery of injured natural resources and the
7
availability of replacement or alternative resources.4
Further, section 702 (b) requires the new 301 (c) rulemaking to
provide for the designation of a single lead federal trustee. Furthermore, all trustees must identify the injured natural resources
within their trusteeships and reveal the authority for the scope of
their trusteeships as soon as practicable after the release affecting
the natural resource. 468 Despite the arduous history of the NRD
rulemakings, Senate Bill 8 optimistically sets the deadline for this
new rulemaking at one year from the enactment of the bill. 46 9
Section 703 requires consistency between NRD restoration
measures and CERCLA remedial actions and states that restoration
measures and remedial actions should be implemented in a coordinated and integrated manner to the extent practicable. 4 70 This
provision recognizes the coordination that one would normally expect from responsible government officials and that PRPs will potentially welcome. A problem with this type of pronouncement is it
fails to address the problems that may occur when NRDs are being
pursued at a site that is not part of the CERCLA process, whether
through the efforts of the federal Trustees without EPA or through
state or tribal Trustees.
Section 704 of Senate Bill 8, the last provision in the NRD title,
wisely amends the section 113 contribution claim provision to include NRDs. 4 71 One remaining question, despite this provision, is
whether strict liability would attach in contribution actions or
whether causation must be established, as in trustee NRD actions.
In other words, if a PRP enters into an NRD settlement with a
trustee and later pursues other parties, that it believes contributed
to the injury, must it tie the other parties to the injury as a "sole or
substantially contributing cause" or merely as a "contributing
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

See S. 8, § 702(b).
See id.
See id.
See S. 8, § 703.
See S. 8, § 704.
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cause?" 472 Alternatively, will the NRD contribution plaintiff receive
the advantage of strict liability? As NRD contribution actions become more common, this issue will be a hotly-contested issue,
whether Senate Bill 8 is enacted or not.
The ambiguities in the NRD scheme point to a thematic problem underlying the entire NRD program: the imprecise manner in
which CERCLA attempts to craft modem statutory patterns onto
common law theories. The following proposal is premised on the
central idea that the NRD mechanism should be independent of
both the common law and media-oriented federal statutes.
XV.

A

BALANCED PROPOSAL

In approaching CERCLA NRDs, the 105th Congress should remember several precepts. First, if they eliminate or significantly degrade NRDs, the pendulum may swing against them in the future
and an even harsher legal tool may be created by a future Democratic Congress. Second, the theory behind NRDs, that polluters
fully internalize their costs, including contamination, in the cost of
their goods and service, is not fundamentally unfair or impracticable. By forcing corporations to account for the full costs of the
goods produced, consumers will allocate society's resources more
efficiently. Third, NRD trustees will, and should, seek to expand
their available cause of action. If they do not, they will be doing a
disservice to their trust.
With these precepts in mind, Congress should create a freestanding statutory scheme to replace the phalanx of federal and
state NRD and quasi-NRD claims. Industry should not be forced to
analyze and anticipate the nuances of even the three "major" federal statutes with NRD provisions (CERCLA, the Oil Pollution Act
and the Clean Water Act). Instead, Congress should bring all of
the NRD provisions of these statutes together under one title and
create some consistency between the programs. This resulting statute should address the following concerns that arise out of the NRD
provisions of CERCLA.
A.

Expressly Preempt Any State Statutory Provision or Common
Law Theory which Provides for NRD Claims

Preemption of state statutory provisions or common law theories may seem severe and may initiate wide opposition from state
472. For a discussion of the causation element in NRD claims, see supra notes
79-90 and accompanying text.
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trustees, but it serves an important purpose echoed throughout this
proposal: allow a full NRD and resonable recovery, but provide
PRPs with certainty. Preemption is justified for two reasons. First,
by eliminating the possibility that a state trustee will assert an NRD
claim under state law, PRPs will be assured that there will only be
one NRD suit for a given injury. Second, preemption would lower
the possibility of double recovery.4 73 However, it should be recognized that, when drafting such a proposal, Congress must pay careful attention to the language used, particularly to avoid preempting
state civil penalty provisions that may incorporate some NRD
4 74
characteristics.
B.

Unify the Trusteeships

Unifying trusteeships addresses the need to assure that no new
or unexpected trustees will be allowed or will be authorized to raise
NRD claims. To achieve this goal of certainty, Congress should begin to take steps to eliminate ambiguity of the governors' designation. Specifically, Congress should require state governors, by
executive order, to specify a single state official or executive agency
who will act as its NRD trustee and require DOI to compile this
information in the Federal Register. Moreover, to eliminate any
further confusion of authorized trustees, Congress should expressly
eliminate municipal trusteeships.
C.

Require Trustees to Follow the Rules Promulgated by DOI

NRDs should be required, as opposed to being given discretion, to follow the assessment process described in DOI regulations. 475 The rebuttable presumption created under section
107(f) (2) (C) of CERCLA, if it is actually worth anything, will help
473. Preemption would merely focus the basis of claims under which nonfederal trustees could sue on CERCIA removing the possibility of recovery under
state statutes or common law theories. Delegation of federal trusteeship to the

other trustees is not necessary to effectuate this end, and actually would harm the
NRD program by removing the expertise of federal trustees from the NRD
"program."
474. Conceptually, civil penalties serve a different purpose than NRDs, by
providing a punitive disincentive to pollution rather than compensation and cost
internalization and allocation. For this reason, reformulation of CERCLA NRDs
should leave states with the ability to create their own policy with regard to civil
penalties. CERCIA could preempt state statutory NRDs and similar common law
claims without disturbing civil penalties. See discussion of Pennsylvania Fish and
Boat Commission and Pennsylvania Game Commission, supra note 125 and accom-

panying text.
475. For a discussion of the rebuttable presumption, see supra notes 407-15
and accompanying text.
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simplify NRD cases and potentially promote early settlement. 47 6 By
compelling all trustees to follow a pre-established routine, PRPs
may be able to better analyze the extent of their liability more efficiently and accurately.
D.

Make the Rules Simple, Flexible and Easy to Apply

The present rules are too difficult to understand and apply.
Many mathematical commentators have compiled logic formulae to
compare the complexity of rules and the effect such complexity has
upon compliance. 4 77 While I cannot offer calculus in support of
this contention, the present rules are simply too complex to be
viewed as fair or practical. Assessments cost too much to perform
under the present rules and, consequently, will take too long to
perform. 4 78 The most recent regulatory approach to this issue is
from NOAA and incorporates the principle that restoration costs
should be attempted first, with valuation serving as both a supplement and a safety net.479 This regulation demonstrates that the
conceptual focus of NRDs is properly shifting from valuation to restoration. It would follow the statutory mandate to restore, enhance
or replace injured resources and lessen the reliance on contentious
methodologies such as CV. For instance, as under the NOAA regulation, if reasonable restoration is not possible, the trustees should
be required to replace the resource with the acquisition of an
equivalent. Such an approach has been favored by commentators
and legislators alike.48 0
E.

Fix the Obvious Problems

First, construct, through legislation as opposed to rulemaking,
a clear statute of limitations provision. Through this provision Congress should attempt to avoid terminology that may potentially be
subject to differing interpretations and should allow trustees adequate time to evaluate their claims. Second, Congress should con476. See CERCLA § 107(f) (2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (C).
477. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, IIJ.
Law, Econ. & Organization 150 (1995) (discussing optimal complexity of legal
rules from cost and compliance perspectives).
478. See id. at 86-99. Brown addresses "CERCLA's shortcomings," and specifically states that "[r] emedies, including removal of hazardous waste, should be costeffective." Id. at 86.
479. See 60 Fed. Reg. 39804 (1995) (proposed rule, promulgated pursuant to
the OPA, regarding the use of CV in NRD assessments).
480. See Frank B. Cross, Restoring Restorationfor NaturalResourceDamages, 24 U.
TOL. L. REV. 321 (1993).
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sider clarifying the language of the fifty million dollar cap 48 1 and
attempt to formulate a clear approach to the retroactive application
of NRDs. The actual mechanism to re-define these latter points is
fundamentally a policy choice, therefore, the predominant concern
from a legal perspective is to make that mechanism as clear as possible to avoid subjecting it to multiple interpretations. Senate Bill 8
does not offer much hope along these lines. 482 Third, Congress
should strive to create an NRD bill that anticipates multiple party
suits, brought both by trustees and private parties seeking contribution. This requires giving the causation requirement an explicit
standard and allowing equitable considerations. The current Congressional attempt, in Senate Bill 8, solves the latter problem but
not the former one. 48 3
F.

Narrow the Scope of the Trusteeships

The first step to narrow the scope of trusteeships is to eliminate the "appertaining to" and "otherwise managed" clauses from
the definition of "natural resources."4 84 In practical effect, these
omissions would potentially curtail the scope of the trusteeships,
but allow trustee ownership and the Public Trust Doctrine to remain as bases of NRD trusteeship. This allows greater certainty for
industry at what is likely a minimal cost from an environmental
prospective,
XVI.

CONCLUSION

CERCLA NRDs are a theoretically complex and statutorily underdefined mechanism. NRDs properly attempt to internalize costs
thrust upon society by pollution into the costs of goods and services. The importance of this goal cannot be denied. However, the
present NRD program not only offends a sense of fairness, but also
fails to accomplish this goal. To initiate the process of internalizing
the costs of pollution, Congress should begin by removing the NRD
program from CERCLA and other relevant statutes and setting
forth a precise and dogmatic scheme to enable incentives for early
settlements and expeditious restoration measures. Specifically,
Congress should design a process for NRD claims that is simple,
481. For a discussion of the fifty million dollar cap, see supranotes 389-96 and
accompanying text.
482. For a discussion of Senate Bill 8, see supra notes 450-56 and accompanying text.
483. See S. 8, § 704 (addressing contribution).
484. For the definition of natural resources, see CERCLA, 101 (16), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(16).
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relatively easy to estimate, and reflects the cost of the injury as the
reasonable cost of restoration. By creating a new federal NRD program outside the media-based statutes, Congress can remove the
uncertainty faced by industry and effectuate the goal of
internalization.
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